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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
v. 
NATHANIEL FREDERICK PENN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030638-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from three enhanced second degree felony convictions for 
possession of psilocin, hydrocodone, and Demerol, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i), (4)(a) (2002 & Supp. 2003). This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Where trial counsel affirmatively approved the very jury instructions 
appellate counsel challenges, is defendant's claim of plain error precluded by the 
invited error doctrine? 
Because defendant's trial counsel affirmatively approved the instructions he 
challenges on appeal (see R507:148), his claims amount to invited error and are, therefore, 
procedurally barred. See State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ffi[ 52-56, 70 P.3d 111. The invited 
error rule not only "fortifies [the] long-established policy that the trial court should have the 
first opportunity to address the claim of error," but it also "discourages parties from 
intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on 
appeal." Id. at ^ 54 (quotations omitted). 
2(a)* Was the search warrant affidavit adequate to establish (1) defendant's 
acceptance of the mushrooms as the only event necessary to trigger the anticipatory 
search warrant's validity, and (2) probable cause to believe the mushrooms and other 
drugs would be found in defendant's residence? 
In reviewing a magistrate's decision to issue a search warrant, the appellate court 
"assess[es] whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for determining that probable cause 
existed." State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, \ 14, 48 P.3d 872 (citations omitted), cert denied, 
535 U.S. 1062 (2002). The Court "afford[s] the magistrate's decision great deference and 
considers] the affidavit relied upon by the magistrate in its entirety and in a common sense 
fashion. Id. (citations omitted). 
2(b). Was trial counsel ineffective because he declined to make futile challenges 
to the anticipatory search warrant's validity? 
"Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims present a mixed question." Parsons v. 
Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 518 (Utah 1994). If a trial court has previously ruled on a claim of 
ineffectiveness, the reviewing court defers to the trial court's findings of fact, but reviews its 
legal conclusions for correctness. State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1238 (Utah App. 1995). 
If ineffectiveness is raised first on appeal, the record must be adequate to permit a decision. 
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State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^  9, 12 P.3d 92. The issue presents a question of law. State 
v. Price, 909 P.2d 256, 264 (Utah App. 1995). 
3, Did the trial court properly reject defendant's new trial motion alleging that 
the State failed to disclose material information about the confidential informant's 
cooperation and/or that trial counsel performed ineffectively in not pursuing this line 
of inquiry? 
The decision to grant or deny a motion for new trial is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion, but "[a]ny legal determinations made by the trial court as a basis for its denial of 
a new trial motion are reviewed for correctness." State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, % 8, 994 P.2d 
1237. 
4. Did the trial court erroneously allow evidence of defendant's drug-related 
indiscretions under rules 402, 403, and 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence? 
Defendant purports to identify ten instances where evidence was admitted in violation 
of the above rules. Aplt. Br. at 43 n.19. However, eight of his allegations of error under rule 
402, and all ten of his claims of error under rules 403 and 404(b) are unpreserved. Because 
defendant argues neither plain error nor ineffective assistance of counsel, these claims are 
now procedurally barred. See State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141,1144-45 (Utah 1989); State 
v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995). 
Defendant arguably preserved relevancy challenges in two instances: to evidence of 
his suicide attempts and prior mushroom use. A trial court's decision to admit or exclude 
evidence on grounds of relevance will be upheld absent an abuse of the lower court's 
3 
discretion. State v. Martin. 2002 UT 34, ^ 34, 44 P.3d 805. Notably, uthe standard for 
determining whether evidence is relevant is so low, the issue of whether evidence is relevant 
is rarely an issue." State v. Jaeger. 1999 UT 1, U 13, 973 P.2d 404. 
5, Has defendant shown that trial counsel was ineffective for not raising a 
Miranda issue where defendant has failed to provide supporting citation to the record? 
Defendant fails to support his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with citation 
to the record; therefore, the claim is inadequately briefed and should be rejected on that 
ground. See State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,450 (Utah 1988); see also State v. Wareham, 772 
P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (declining to address argument on the ground that defendant's 
brief "wholly lacks legal analysis and authority to support his argument"). Moreover, 
"[w]here the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting 
therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively." 
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ 17, 12 P.3d 92. 
6. Do defendant's multiple and unsubstantiated claims of prejudicial error 
require reversal of the jury verdict under the cumulative error doctrine? 
Whether the cumulative effect of individually harmless errors requires reversal turns 
on whether the errors as a whole undermine confidence in the outcome. State v. Colwell, 
2000UT8,1J44,994P.2d 177. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. CONST, amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath, or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. Amend. VI: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defense. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with three enhanced second degree felonies for possession of 
psilocin, hydrocodone, and Demerol, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), 
(4)(a) (2002 & Supp. 2003). R142-143. Following a three-day jury trial on 20-22 November 
2002, defendant was convicted as charged. R202. The trial court imposed three concurrent 
statutory terms of one-to-fifteen years. R213-215. The trial court then suspended the 
statutory terms and placed defendant on probation. Id, 
Defendant filed a timely new trial motion, which the trial court denied in a written 
ruling on 28 July 2003. R480-485 (a copy is attached in addendum E). 
Defendant timely appealed. R487. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
After investigating defendant's drug-related activities for approximately two months, 
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) conducted a warrant-supported search of 
defendant's residence on 20 April 2002. See R83-87 (a copy of the search warrant and 
affidavit is attached in addendum A). That search yielded psilocin mushrooms, hydrocodone 
and demerol. R506:157-159. 
Lisa Comes Forward, The DEA began investigating defendant based on information 
obtained from an employee in defendant's Moab Family Practice Clinic, Lisa LaPlante. 
R506:66-68. Lisa first contacted law enforcement in late January 2002 with information 
about defendant's illicit drug-related activities. Id. Lisa was upset that defendant had 
reported her husband, Gene LaPlante, to police for assaulting her. Id. According to Lisa, 
Gene's "total behavior had changed" after he began taking Oxycontin given to him by 
defendant over a period of five or six months. R506:67, 90. Lisa was angry with defendant 
because she "had been begging [defendant] for help for months, and he didn't ever help." 
R506:93. Lisa decided to go to the police with her concerns about defendant after reading 
his statement regarding Gene's assault: 
Most of what was written on the statement as being my words was actually 
[defendant's] words, and I felt I needed to justify that my husband had never 
been in trouble. He was basically what I felt losing his mind, and I needed to 
explain to them that, you know, we were - -1 was seeking [defendant's] help 
lThe facts are recited in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling denying 
defendant's motion to suppress, see State v. Tetmeyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App. 
1997), and to the jury verdict, see State v. Litherhand, 2000 UT 76, ^  2, 12 P.3d 92. 
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all along, and I felt he had turned at the most critical point in my husband's 
care. 
R506:66, 68-69. Lisa agreed to became a confidential informant in approximately March 
2002. R506:69, 143. Although charged with felony assault, Gene was ultimately allowed 
to plead guilty to a reduced charge of brandishing a firearm. R506:67, 92-93. Lisa and 
Gene have since sued defendant for malpractice. R506:93-94. 
Lisa's Observations. Lisa told law enforcement that Cindy Drew, her long-time 
friend and defendant's girlfriend, introduced her to defendant in January 2001. R506:85. 
Defendant and Cindy hired Lisa to do transcription work in defendant's clinic. R506:60. By 
July 2001, Lisa was promoted to office manager. R506:61,86. While working at the clinic, 
Lisa observed that defendant told some patients to return their unused medications to his 
office, if "it didn't agree with them, or they were getting a different kind." R506:62. The 
returned medications "usually went on a shelf or in a drawer." Id. Lisa mentioned her 
concerns about the propriety of this practice to defendant and tried to maintain a log of those 
patients returning medication "so that I wasn't responsible, 'cause I was taking it, and gave 
it to him." R506:63. Defendant continued the practice over Lisa's objections. Id. It was 
some of this returned medication that defendant provided, on at least two occasions, to Lisa's 
husband Gene, still with the original patient's name on the bottle. R506:63-64. 
On one occasion, Lisa found defendant sleeping in a back room of the clinic, "and 
there was like a tourniquet on the floor and bent needles on the floor. There were times he 
just was acting weird all day, walking almost into walls. Be doing his dictation at night and 
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not recall who he had seen or why, and he had to be reminded by office staff." R506:64-65. 
Lisa further reported that Cindy, who also worked in the clinic, told her that she 
(Cindy) and defendant took hallucinogenic mushrooms: 
I just remember I was sitting at my desk, and Cindy said, we're going to be 
closed tomorrow, which I believe was like on a Wednesday or something like 
that, and she said that they had some mushrooms, and they were going to take 
the day off and go do mushrooms. I remember specifically because I swung 
around in my chair and said, what? 
R506:66. 
Defendant's Recorded Inculpatory Statements. In March 2002 Lisa was contacted 
by Agent Johnson of the DEA. R506:69, 143. Johnson asked Lisa to cooperate with his 
investigation: "Basically to keep observing what was going on." R506:70. Toward the end 
of April, Lisa and Johnson discussed "[her] going in and talking to [defendant] about what 
he thought of [her] doing mushrooms." R506:71. Wearing a hidden recording device, Lisa 
engaged defendant in a conversation about mushrooms. R506:72, 144-145. Specifically, 
Lisa mentioned that her brother was coming to town, and that he wanted her to take 
hallucinogenic mushrooms with him. R506:73. When Lisa asked defendant if that would 
be safe, defendant responded that "he had taken them plenty of times," that "he had done 
them in the clinic," and that mushrooms were "not like pot, where it stays in your system for 
a long time, that's why he chooses to do them." R506:74. See also R501:Exh. #7 at 12-13, 
29-32.2 Defendant also admitted being "on 'shrooms most of the day [he] was in the clinic," 
2R501 is a manilla envelope containing Exh. ## 1, 6-9 
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and that "that's really why they fired [him] from the hospital actually. Drugs." Exh. # 7 at 
13. As Lisa prepared to leave, defendant twice inquired if her brother had any "extra" 
mushrooms that he could buy. R506:75. See R501:Exh. # 7 at 33. 
On another occasion, while visiting Cindy at the house she shared with defendant, 
Lisa observed Demerol in their refrigerator. R506:78. On yet another occasion, when 
neither Cindy nor defendant were present, Lisa observed a prescription bottle of hydrocodone 
for patient Robert Silver in their bathroom medicine cabinet. Id. 
When defendant's clinic closed in March 2002, Lisa assisted defendant and Cindy in 
packing up the medications and other items in the clinic. R506:79. While Lisa delivered the 
packages to defendant's residence, she did not assist in carrying them inside. Id. 
The Anticipatory Search Warrant Affidavit. Johnson prepared an anticipatory search 
warrant for "controlled substances, including, but not limited to, psiloc[in] mushrooms" in 
defendant's residence. R84, add. A. See also R501:Exh. # 1 (search warrant). 
The probable cause statement stated: 
On January 21,2002, CI gave a statement to law enforcement outlining 
Penn's improper use of his DEA license in prescribing narcotics. CI said when 
a prescription is filled under a staff member's name, it is shared with Dr. Penn 
and other staff. CI said narcotics are left out on Dr. Penn's shelf or in his desk 
drawer or filing cabinet. CI said Dr. Penn has seen patients while he was 
under the influence of narcotics and to the extent that staff members had to 
remind him of why he saw the patients so he could dictate because he could 
not remember. CI said pharmacies often call because prescriptions are wrong 
or are written for the wrong amounts or doses. CI said one patient had med 
boxes in the office and the medications were gone before they should have 
been, so to make up for the missing meds, Dr. Penn called in a new 
prescription with an increase in dosage. CI said Dr. Penn sent out letters 
stating he would no longer prescribe [Ojxycontin, but yet he continued to 
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prescribe [Ojxycontin. CI said a patient brought five Duragesic patches and 
four came up missing. On January 30, 2002, CI said Cindy Drew told her that 
they were closing early the next day because she and Dr. Penn were going to 
do mushrooms. The DEA was contacted with his information. 
Approximately two weeks ago, CI was in the residence described above 
as 300 East 300 South, Moab, Grand County, Utah, and saw some multi-dose 
vials of Demerol in their refrigerator. CI also saw some [Ojxycontin in a 
prescription bottle, labeled with the name of Robert Silver, in the bathroom. 
On April 19, 2002, CI was wired by agents and CI went to the above 
described residence. CI asked Penn and Drew about the side effects of using 
mushrooms. CI said CI's brother had some mushrooms that CI was 
considering trying. Penn and Drew gave CI their opinion of how safe 
mushrooms were and said it was good. They described how mushrooms 
would make CI feel which was based on their past experience of using 
mushrooms. Penn then said to CI[,] if he stocked any extra, we 11 buy it. Drew 
then said they got theirs from the northwest. Penn then said again, If he's got 
any extra, I11 buy some from him. Penn then said again, If he fs got any extra, 
III buy some from him. Penn then said, enough for two of us. Drew then said, 
Well, 111 buy some for Dave too, cuz I owe Dave a favor and he wanted some.3 
Dr. Nathaniel Penn and Cindy Drew live together in the above 
described residence and said residence is within a drug free zone. 
R86-87, add. A (emphasis in original). 
The affidavit also included a paragraph anticipating events to occur on 20 April 2002, 
the date Lisa returned to defendant's residence with an undercover DEA agent posing as her 
brother. R506:190-191. The validity of the anticipatory search warrant was conditioned 
"upon the occurrence of the events described in the affidavit." R84, add. A. 
ANTICIPATORY INFORMATION: On April 20, 2002, between 1000 and 
noon, DEA agents will meet with CI. CI and an undercover agent (UC) will 
3At trial, Lisa and Johnson testified that this conversation occurred on 12 April 
2002. &eR506:73-76, 145-148. 
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be searched and CI will be wired. CI or UC will be given some psilocybin 
mushrooms. CI's vehicle will also be searched. CI and an undercover agent 
will drive in CI's vehicle to the above described residence of Penn and Drew 
with the mushrooms. Agents will have CI and UC under visual and audio 
observation at all times driving to and from said residence. They will have CI 
and UC under audio observation while they are in the residence. It is 
anticipated that CI and UC will offer Penn and/or Drew the mushrooms for 
sale for either cash and/or controlled substance prescriptions. After CI and UC 
leave the residence, CI and UC and CI's vehicle will be re-searched. 
R87, add. A. 
Based on the affidavit, the magistrate determined there was probable cause to believe 
that psilocin and other narcotics would be discovered inside defendant's residence on 20 
April 2002. Id. The magistrate signed the warrant on 19 April 2002. Id. 
The Mushroom Exchange. When Lisa and the undercover agent arrived at 
defendant's residence on the morning of 20 April 2002, he was alone. R506:82, 191-192. 
Lisa introduced the two men and the agent posing as Lisa's brother asked defendant if he was 
interested in buying some mushrooms. R506:82. See also R501:Exh. # 8 at 1. Defendant 
responded affirmatively. Id. Quality and pricing were discussed and defendant purchased 
and received two bags of hallucinogenic mushrooms. R506:83,190. Although the undercover 
agent initially asked defendant to trade Lortab or hydrocodone for the mushrooms, defendant 
declined, preferring to paying $80 cash instead. R506:83-84,156, 192-193. See also 
R501 :Exh. # 8 at 2-3. Once the mushroom exchange was complete, Lisa and the agent left. 
R506:193. 
The Search. Officers waiting to execute the search warrant overheard the completed 
mushroom exchange and moved in immediately. R506:155-157, 163, 190, 195. Once the 
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area was secured, the house was searched. Id. Defendant was asked to cooperate with the 
search, but initially denied buying any mushrooms. R506:157. Eventually, defendant 
admitted buying the mushrooms and indicated they could be found in a kitchen drawer. Id. 
A further search of the house yielded a prescription bottle of hydrocodone tablets for 
Robert Silver. R506:159. Of the 80 tablets prescribed, only eight remained. Id. An 
injectable 20 millimeter bottle of Demerol, with about 15 millimeters remaining, was found 
inside the refrigerator. Id. 
Motion to Suppress Denied. Defendant moved to suppress the physical evidence 
seized. R76-81 (a copy of the motion to suppress and memorandum is contained in 
addendum B). A hearing on the motion was held on 30 October 2002. R504 (a copy of the 
suppression hearing transcript is contained in addendum C). Defendant alleged that the 
anticipatory search warrant was invalid (1) because it contained "no statement or assurance 
that [djefendant would purchase the substance," and (2) because Lisa's observations of 
controlled substances in his bathroom and kitchen were unlawful. R80, add. B; R504:15,18-
23, add. C. The trial court received transcriptions and recordings of the conversations 
between Lisa, Cindy and/or defendant, but heard no witnesses. R504:7-8, add. C. See 
R501:Exh. ## 6-8. Following the parties' arguments, the trial court denied the motion to 
suppress in an oral ruling. R504:15, 18-31, add. C. 
Motion for New Trial Denied. Following his jury conviction, defendant filed a 
motion for new trial alleging that: (1) the elements instructions were plainly erroneous; (2) 
the search warrant was invalid because the triggering event did not occur and Lisa's illegal 
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observation of drugs should have been stricken therefrom; (3) the State failed to disclose 
material information about Lisa's cooperation with law enforcement and/or trial counsel 
performed ineffectively by not pursuing this line of inquiry; and (4) trial counsel performed 
ineffectively in not raising a Miranda issue. R235-25L R336-352 (a copy of the new trial 
motion, supporting memorandum, and supplemental memorandum are attached in addendum 
D). The State filed a written response. R410-421. A hearing was held on 8 July 2003. 
R505. Thereafter, the trial court denied the new trial motion. R481-486, add. E. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. Trial counsel affirmed the instructional language appellate counsel 
challenges on appeal; accordingly, defendant's plain error claim is precluded by the invited 
error doctrine. 
Point II. The affidavit in support of the anticipatory search warrant provides a 
substantial basis from which the trial court—and the magistrate—properly determined that 
the triggering event for the warrant's validity was defendant's acceptance of the mushrooms, 
and that there was probable cause to believe that hallucinogenic mushrooms and other 
controlled substances would be found inside defendant's residence on the specified date. The 
trial court's—and the magistrate's—probable cause determination is supportable even if 
Lisa's observations of Oxycontin and Demerol are excised from the affidavit. 
Trial counsel was not ineffective in not making futile challenges to the affidavit 
regarding (1) Lisa's reliability because the only reasonable inference was that she was a 
clinic employee and family friend uniquely situated to observe first-hand defendant's drug-
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related indiscretions; or (2) law enforcement's failure to re-search Lisa prior to executing the 
warrant because such a search was unnecessary to establish probable cause or the warrant's 
validity. 
Finally, even if the search warrant is deemed invalid, the search was still justified on 
the alternative grounds of probable cause and exigent circumstances. 
Point III. Defendant's new trial motion alleged that the State failed to disclose 
material information about Lisa's cooperation, or alternatively, that trial counsel performed 
ineffectively in not pursuing this line of inquiry. The trial court properly rejected these 
claims based on its findings that trial counsel in fact introduced evidence of Gene LaPlante's 
assault charge and its disposition and used this evidence strategically at trial. Defendant has 
not attempted, let alone shown, that the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous. 
In any event, defendant concedes that trial counsel presented sufficient evidence for 
the jury to infer that Lisa cooperated with the DEA here in exchange for a favorable 
disposition of Gene's case. Thus, the crux of defendant's complaint is not so much about a 
discovery violation as it is that trial counsel failed to make express what he had already made 
implicit by introducing evidence of the disposition of the felony charge against Gene. That 
appellate counsel may propose an equally reasonable strategy or argument is insufficient to 
overcome the heavy presumption that counsel acted reasonably. 
Point IV. Defendant identifies ten instances where he alleges "bad acts" evidence 
was admitted in violation of Utah Rules of Evidence 402,403, and 404(b). But trial counsel 
arguably timely objected only twice, and then only on relevance grounds. Thus, the bulk of 
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defendant's claims, including all of his claims under rules 404(b) and 403, are unpreserved. 
Because defendant argues neither plain error nor ineffective assistance of counsel, these 
claims are also procedurally barred. Finally, while defendant arguably timely preserved 
relevancy challenges to evidence of his suicide attempts and prior mushroom use, he fails to 
demonstrate any abuse of the trial court's discretion in admitting this evidence, or that it was 
unfairly prejudicial. 
Point V. Defendant cannot show that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise 
a Miranda issue where defendant himself has failed to point to record support for his claim. 
Even assuming defendant's brief is deemed adequate, defendant suffered no unfair prejudice. 
Therefore, his ineffectiveness claim fails. 
Point VI. Defendant's multiple unsubstantiated claims do not require reversal under 
the cumulative error doctrine. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT AFFIRMATIVELY APPROVED THE VERY 
INSTRUCTIONAL LANGUAGE HE CHALLENGES ON APPEAL; 
THEREFORE, HIS CLAIM OF PLAIN ERROR IS PRECLUDED BY 
THE INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE 
In Point I of his brief, defendant challenges elements instructions ## 3 and 6 as plainly 
erroneous. Aplt. Br. at 20. But as found by the trial court in ruling on defendant's new trial 
motion, defendant invited the very errors of which he complains on appeal by affirmatively 
approving the language below. See R507:148; R484-485, add. E. Therefore, defendant's 
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plain error claim is precluded by the invited error doctrine. See State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 
22, IN 52-56, 70 P.3d 111. 
Proceedings Below. At the conclusion of the second day of trial, outside the 
presence of the jury, the trial court proposed instructing the jury regarding defendant's 
alleged illicit possession of hydrocodone (count II) and Demerol (count III) as follows: 
Now, what I - - just what I've worked out at this point on that subject 
is physicians licensed or practiced to prescribe controlled substances must still 
obtain a prescription for controlled substances for personal use. Physicians 
licensed to dispense or administer controlled substances are also permitted to 
possess reasonable quantities of controlled substances for dispensing or 
administering to patients, but they are required to keep a record of controlled 
substances received for that purpose and dispensed or administered by them 
as physicians. A physician who fails to follow this requirement is possessing 
those substances illegally. 
And that relates back to an element in the instruction, elements in the 
instruction I say that the State has to prove that it was possessed without a 
prescription or without otherwise complying. That sound about right to you? 
(Inaudible) actual language? 
R507:147-148 (copies of pertinent transcript pages are attached as addendum F) (emphasis 
added). Defendant's trial counsel responded, "Right. I think so." R507:148, add. F. The 
trial court concluded, "Okay. Those are the only things that I had questions about before I 
start the typewriter going. Anything either of you want to bring out at this point that I can 
try to incorporate in the instructions that's kind of popped up since?" Id. Neither party 
expressed concern about the elements instructions at that time, see R507:148-149, add. F, 
or the next day when the trial court again invited the parties' comments on the now written 
instructions, see R508:3-9, add. F. 
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The trial court incorporated the approved language for counts II and III into jury 
instructions # 3 and # 6: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 34 
In order to obtain a conviction, the state must prove each element of the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Those elements are as follows: . . . 
COUNT II: ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF HYDROCODONE IN A 
DRUG FREE ZONE 
1. That on or about April 20, 2002, 
2. Defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed hydrocodone, 
3. In a drug free zone, 
4. Without a prescription or otherwise complying with the law. 
COUNT III: ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DEMEROL IN A DRUG 
FREE ZONE 
1. That on or about April 20, 2002, 
2. Defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed demerol, 
3. In a drug free zone, 
4. Without a prescription or otherwise complying with the law. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
Physicians licensed to prescribe controlled substances must still obtain 
a prescription for any controlled substances for personal use. Physicians 
licensed to dispense or administer controlled substances are also permitted to 
possess reasonable quantities of controlled substances for dispensing or 
administering to patients, but they are required to keep a record of controlled 
substances received for that purpose and dispensed or administered by them 
as physicians. A physician who fails to comply with this requirement 
possesses those substances illegally. 
4Because defendant does not challenge the elements of count I (psilocin), that 
language is not set forth here. 
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R184, 188 (copies of the jury instructions are attached in addendum G) (contested language 
emphasized). See also R508:12-13 (jury instructions # 3 and # 6 read to jury). 
Defendant first challenged instructions # 3 and # 6 as plainly erroneous in his motion 
for new trial. R217, 238, 240-243, add. D. The trial court rejected his claim, ruling that 
defendant's decision to "accept language that was arguably more favorable than other 
alternatives [was] not objectively unreasonable." R485, add. E. The trial court further ruled 
that "[defendant] [could not] now be permitted to second guess that decision and obtain a 
new trial with a different instruction, followed if necessary by a third trial with yet a third 
version of the instructions." Id. 
Invited Error. Notwithstanding his affirmation of the instructional language in the 
trial court, defendant claims on appeal that instructions # 3 and # 6 plainly misstate the 
possession statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), (4)(a) (2002 & Supp. 2003)), 
"effectively creating a new crime that violated due process." Aplt. Br. at 18. 
Ordinarily, a party cannot challenge a jury instruction on appeal without preserving 
an objection in the trial court. See Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e). Where a party fails to object 
below, the instruction is reviewable only for "manifest injustice" or plain error. Id. See State 
v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1226 (Utah 1998) ("Where reviewing a claim of manifest 
injustice, [this Court] generally use[s] the same standard that is applied to determine whether 
plain error exists under rule 103(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence."). As set forth recently 
by the Utah Supreme Court, "[t]o review an instruction under the manifest injustice 
exception, counsel must have failed to object to the instruction." Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, |^ 
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54 (emphasis in original). If however, "counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively 
represented to the court that he or she had no objection to the jury instruction, [the appellate 
court] will not review the instruction'' even under the manifest injustice or plain error 
exception. Id. (citing State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996)). Indeed, to do 
so would be to invite error. The invited error rule "prevents a party from 'tak[ing] advantage 
of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error.'" 
Id. (quoting Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 
1993)). See also State v. Perdue, &\3?.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah App. 1991) (refusing to review 
claim of constitutional error in reasonable doubt instruction, under the invited error doctrine). 
Given the above, defendant's plain error claim is precluded by the invited error 
doctrine. Defendant did not merely fail to object to the contested language of instructions 
# 3 and # 6; rather, when the trial court asked if the proposed language "sound[ed] about 
right," defendant's trial counsel responded, "Right. I think so." R507:147-148, add. F. Thus, 
any possible error was invited by defendant's affirmation of the language. His claim of 
instructional error may not now be reviewed even under the manifest injustice or plain error 
standard. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f 54. 
POINT II 
EVIDENCE THAT A WARRANT-SUPPORTED SEARCH OF 
DEFENDANT'S RESIDENCE YIELDED PSILOCIN, HYDROCODONE 
AND DEMEROL WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED 
In Point II of his brief, defendant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his 
motion to suppress the psilocin, hydrocodone and Demerol found during a warrant-supported 
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search of his house. Aplt. Br. at 27-36. Defendant alleges that the trial court erroneously 
refused to suppress this evidence because the anticipatory search warrant arguably authorized 
a search even if he had refused the psilocin mushrooms, and because the affidavit was based 
in part on Lisa's alleged illegal observations of Demerol and Oxycontin in his residence. 
Aplt. Br. at 30, 32. Defendant further complains that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to challenge the search warrant on the additional grounds that: (1) the "requisite 
'triggering events' did not occur" because police did not re-search Lisa or the undercover 
agent prior to executing the search warrant, and (2) Lisa's veracity and reliability as a 
confidential informant was not established in the affidavit. Aplt. Br. at 30. Defendant's 
claims lack merit and should be rejected. 
Proceedings Below. Trial counsel moved to suppress the narcotics seized alleging 
that the search warrant affidavit contained "no statement or assurance that [d]efendant would 
purchase the substance," or, in other words, that there was no assurance defendant would 
have the mushrooms "in his possession" when the search warrant was executed. R80, add. 
B. At a hearing held on 30 October 2002, trial counsel raised the additional challenge that 
information regarding Lisa's observations of Demerol and Oxycontin were illegal because 
she was acting an agent of the State. R504:15, 18-23, add. C. 
In addition to hearing the parties' arguments, see R504:15, 18-29, add. C, the trial 
court received as exhibits, transcriptions of the recorded conversations between Lisa and 
defendant wherein defendant offered to buy any "extra" mushrooms, and then bought 
mushrooms from the undercover DEA agent. R504:7-8. See R501:Exh. ## 6-8. 
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Thereafter, the trial court rejected defendant's claims in an oral ruling, finding that the 
anticipatory nature of the warrant did not render it invalid because it was conditioned on 
"specific events." R504:29, add. C. And, even if information regarding Lisa's observations 
of drugs in the kitchen and bathroom was excised, there was "ample probable cause . . . to 
support the issuance of the warrant. So I'm going to deny the motion." Id. 
Trial counsel nevertheless argued that if the trial court excised Lisa's observations of 
Oxycontin and Demerol from the warrant, "there's no reason for them to be looking in the 
bathroom cabinet and the refrigerator, because they were directed immediately to the 
mushrooms, which were really, at that point, the only focus of the warrant that's left." 
R504:29-30, add. C. The trial court accordingly clarified his ruling: 
I think the warrant would-once there's probable cause to believe that 
there is some in the house, I think they're entitled to look everywhere in the 
house. I think that's pretty well established. 
So having considered that argument, and even if I-if you had the 
opportunity to present that evidence, it would not change my ruling with 
respect to the evidence that was eventually seized. 
R504:30, add. C. 
Following his jury conviction, defendant challenged the trial court's denial of his 
motion to suppress in his new trial motion. R217-218, 235-250, 336-353, add. D. In 
addition to renewing his complaint that the anticipatory search warrant failed to identify a 
triggering event, defendant claimed that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that 
(1) the triggering event did not occur because police failed to re-search Lisa, the undercover 
DEA agent, or their vehicle before executing the warrant, (2) the affidavit failed to establish 
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Lisa's veracity and reliability as a confidential informant, and (3) "some of the information 
contained in the affidavit was based on an illegal search." Id. 
The trial court declined to reconsider arguments it had previously ruled on and found 
defendant's new claim to lack merit. R480, add. E. Specifically, the trial court ruled that the 
search warrant affidavit sufficiently established that the triggering event was defendant's 
"acceptance of the offer," and therefore the validity of the warrant was not conditioned on 
police re-searching Lisa, the DEA agent, or their car. R481, add. E. The trial court did not 
address defendant's claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not raising this and other 
challenges to the search warrant. R480-481, add. E. 
A. The trial court—and the magistrate—properly determined that a 
common sense reading of the affidavit identified defendant's 
acceptance of the mushrooms as the triggering event that would 
justify the anticipatory warrant's execution. 
In Point 11(A) of his brief, defendant complains that the trial court improperly 
"attempted to read the mind of the magistrate" by ruling that, '"even though the affidavit 
failed to recite that the officers expected [defendant] to accept the offer of drugs, . . . the 
magistrate clearly intended that acceptance of the offer would be the trigger for execution of 
the warrant, and the conduct of the officers shows that they understood this as well/" Aplt. 
Br. at 28 (quoting R481, add. E). The trial court's—and the magistrate's—common sense 
reading of the affidavit should be upheld. 
Totality of the circumstances. A challenge to a search warrant is governed by the 
"totality of the circumstances" standard articulated over twenty years ago in Illinois v. Gates, 
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462 U.S. 213 (1983). Gates held that kfc[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make 
a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the 
affidavit..., there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found 
in a particular place." Id. at 238 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court explained that in 
determining probable cause, courts simply deal with probabilities—'"the factual and practical 
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians 
act.'" Id. at 231 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)). See also 
United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 352 F.3d 1325, 1331 (10th Cir. 2003) ("A 
magistrate's issuance of a warrant must be evaluated in accordance with 'practical, 
commonsense' considerations") (quoting Gates, A62 U.S. at 238)). 
The Supreme Court further observed that "the duty of a reviewing court is simply to 
ensure that the magistrate had a 'substantial basis for. . . concluding]' that probable cause 
existed." Id. at 238-39 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (I960)); accord 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1259-60 (Utah 1993). In other words, "after-the-fact 
scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo 
review." Id. at 236 (internal quotes and citations omitted); accord State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 
987, 991 (Utah 1989). Rather, a reviewing court should pay "great deference" to the 
magistrate's probable cause determination. Id. at 236; accord Babbell, 770 P.2d at 991. "A 
grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts towards warrants is inconsistent with the 
Fourth Amendment's strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant." Id. at 
236 (internal quotes and citations omitted). Gates thus held that "'the resolution of doubtful 
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or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded 
to wanmtsr" Id. at237nA0 (quoting United States^ Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102,109(1965)). 
Anticipatory Search Warrants- The above principles apply even if a search warrant 
affidavit, as here, anticipates that probable cause—absent at the time the warrant is 
issued—will exist prior to the warrant's execution or the search. See Hernandez-Rodriguez, 
352 F.3d at 1331 ("This Court has rejected any suggestion that an affidavit in support of an 
anticipatory warrant must be subjected to closer scrutiny than an affidavit seeking the 
issuance of a warrant which would be effective immediately") (quoting United States v. 
Hugoboom, 112F.3d 1081,1086 (10th Cir. 1997)). See State v. Womack, 967 P.2d 536, 543 
(Utah App. 1998) (reviewing an anticipatory affidavit "as a whole and with a 'common 
sense' orientation, deferring to the magistrate'^ decision"). Unlike a non-anticipatory 
warrant, "[p]robable cause to support anticipatory warrants is conditioned on the occurrence 
of certain expected or triggering events, typically the future delivery, sale, or purchases of 
contraband." Womack, 967 P.2d at 543 (citations omitted). If the anticipated event does not 
occur, probable cause is not established and the anticipatory warrant is invalid. Id. 
Because the existence of probable cause in an anticipatory warrant "depends on 
whether certain events occur," the affidavit "must state conditions allowing the search to be 
done only after those expected events occur." Id. To protect against "premature execution 
of the warrant," and to ensure "judicial control over the probable cause determination," the 
"conditions controlling the warrant's execution '"should be explicit, clear, and narrowly 
drawn so as to avoid misunderstanding or manipulation by government agents."'" Id. at 544 
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(quoting United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1201 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting United 
States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 703-704 (2nd Cir. 1989))). Nevertheless, "the specificity 
with which the magistrate should state the conditions dictating the warrant's execution will 
shift depending on the facts of each case/' Id. 
This case. While the affidavit here could have been more artfully drafted, a common 
sense reading identifies defendant's acceptance of the mushrooms as the triggering event that 
would justify the search warrant's execution. Indeed, the affidavit quotes from a recorded 
conversation between Lisa and defendant approximately two weeks before the anticipatory 
search warrant was issued on 19 April 2002, wherein defendant twice offered to purchase 
any "extra" mushrooms Lisa's brother might have: 
[Defendant] then said to [Lisa] If he stocked any extra, we'll buy it. [Cindy] 
then said they got theirs from the Northwest. [Defendant] then said again, If 
he's got any extra, I'll buy some from him. [Defendant] then said, enough for 
two of us. [Cindy] then said, Well, I'll buy some for Dave too, cuz I owe Dave 
a favor and he wanted some. 
R86, add. A (emphasis in original). 
The above paragraph must be read together with a subsequent "anticipatory 
paragraph" which provides that on 20 April 2002, Lisa and an undercover DEA agent posing 
as her brother will "offer [defendant] and/or [Cindy] the mushrooms for sale for either cash 
and/or controlled substance prescriptions. After [Lisa] and the [undercover agent] leave the 
residence, [Lisa] and [the undercover agent] will be re-searched." R87,add. A. Because the 
affidavit indicates the undercover agent will be wearing a hidden recording device, the 
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issuing magistrate knew police could monitor the transaction and thus know when or whether 
defendant accepted the mushrooms. Id. 
When read together, the above paragraphs sufficiently establish that there was no 
event other than defendant's acceptance of the offered mushrooms that could or would 
establish probable cause to believe he then possessed them. Therefore, the trial court—and 
the magistrate—properly determined that the affidavit sufficiently identified defendant's 
acceptance of the mushrooms as the triggering event or condition precedent to the warrant's 
validity, even though such is not expressly stated therein. R481, add. E. See Womack, 967 
P.2d at 544 ("the specificity with which the magistrate should state the conditions dictating 
the warrant's execution will shift depending on the facts of each case"). 
Moreover, there is no evidence police mistook the triggering event or otherwise 
manipulated the affidavit in order to perform an unjustified search. Id. To the contrary, at 
trial, Special Agent Bacon affirmed trial counsel's representations that the "anticipatory 
event was you selling [defendant] mushrooms, correct?" and "[h]ad you not been able to do 
that, you could not have gone into the house and searched the house correct?" R506:195.5 
5Most appellate courts (Utah has no rule), in reviewing the denial of a pretrial 
motion, consider only evidence before the court at the time of the pretrial motion. See 
United States v. McRae, 156 F.3d 708, 711 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Hicks, 978 
F.2d 722, 724-725 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Baez v. State, 425 S.E.2d 885, 890 (Ga. App. 1992); 
State v. Ryder, 315 N.W.2d 786, 788-789 (Iowa 1982); Aiken v. State, 647 A.2d 1229, 
1232 (Md. App. 1994); Commonwealth v. Powers, 398 A.2d 1013, 1014 (Pa. 1979). 
Some appellate courts will consider both pretrial and trial evidence in reviewing a pretrial 
ruling. However, courts endorsing this rule generally do so in the context of affirming a 
pretrial ruling. United States v. Muniz, 1 F.3d 1018, 1021-1022 (10th Cir. 1993); United 
States v. Martin, 982 F.2d 1236, 1239-1240 n.2 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Basey, 
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Nor does defendant dispute that he in fact accepted the mushrooms prior to the search 
warrant's execution. See R505:41. Had police in fact acted prematurely here, before 
defendant accepted the mushrooms, suppression would have been an available remedy. 
Womack, 967 P.2d at 543. Because police properly waited until after defendant accepted the 
mushrooms, they acted in accord with the only viable triggering event identified in the 
anticipatory affidavit. R481, add. E. The search was therefore justified and suppression is 
unwarranted. 
B. Even excising Lisa's observations of Demerol and 
Oxycontin, the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe 
that mushrooms and other controlled substances would be 
found inside defendant's residence. 
In Point 11(C)(1) of his brief, defendant asserts that "because [Lisa's] search was 
improper, [] information obtained as a result should have been stricken," and that absent that 
information, "there [was] absolutely no basis to search [his] home for [D]emerol, 
hydrocodone, or any other medically prescribed controlled substance."6 Aplt. Br. at 34. As 
816 F.2d 980, 983 n.l (5th Cir. 1987); State v. Young, 576 So.2d 1048, 1054-1055, n.l 
(La. App. 1991); State v. Duncan, 879 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Mo. App. 1994). Contra State 
v. Kong, 883 P.2d 686, 688 (Haw. App. 1994) (reversal). The principle unifying these 
cases is that an appellate court may affirm, but will not reverse, a ruling based on 
evidence not before the district court at the time it ruled. The State is aware of no 
jurisdiction that has adopted a rule that an appellate court may reverse a pretrial ruling 
based only on evidence presented at trial. 
defendant's new trial motion asserted that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to raise this claim below. See R347, see add. D. Defendant does not reassert this 
particular claim of ineffectiveness on appeal, see Aplt. Br. at 33-34, 36-37, apparently 
recognizing that trial counsel in fact unsuccessfully challenged the warrant's validity 
based on the inclusion of Lisa's alleged illegal observations of Demerol and Oxycontin in 
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set forth above, the trial court excised Lisa's observations of Demerol and Oxycontin and 
found there was still probable cause to search for mushrooms and other controlled 
substances. R504:29-20, add. C; R506:99-102; R481, add. E. That correct ruling should be 
upheld. 
Here, the search warrant authorized police to look for mushrooms and other controlled 
substances. See R84, add. A. Considering the affidavit as a whole, and even excising the 
paragraph about Lisa's observations of Demerol and Oxycontin inside defendant's house, 
there remained probable cause to search for controlled substances in addition to the psilocin 
mushrooms defendant had just purchased. The first paragraph of section five of the affidavit, 
for example, identifies multiple drug-related improprieties observed by Lisa while working 
at defendant's clinic, including two instances of missing medication: 
. . . CI said when a prescription is filled under a staff member's name, it is 
shared with [defendant] and other staff. CI said narcotics are left out on 
[defendant's] shelf or in his desk drawer or filing cabinet. CI said [defendant] 
has seen patients while he under the influence of narcotics and to the extent 
that staff members had to remind him of why he saw the patients so he could 
dictate because he could not remember. CI said pharmacies often call because 
prescriptions are wrong or are written for the wrong amounts or doses. CI said 
one patient had med boxes in the office and the medications were gone before 
they should have been, so to make up for the missing meds, [defendant] called 
in a new prescription with an increase in dosage. CI said [defendant] sent out 
letters stating he would no longer prescribe [0]xycontin, but yet he continued 
to prescribe [0]xycontin. CI said a patient brought in five Duragesic patches 
and four came up missing. 
R86, add. A (emphasis added). 
the affidavit below. See R504:29-30, add. B; R506:99-i02. 
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This paragraph gives rise to a fair inference that medication missing from defendant's 
clinic may be found, along with the mushrooms, inside his residence. Indeed, police had 
probable cause to believe defendant a doctor, had previously used and possessed at least one 
controlled substance (psilocin) in his house. Id. If, as suggested in the affidavit, defendant 
was also involved in removing medication from his clinic, it is a fair inference that he was 
storing the missing medication for his personal use at his house. See Womack, 967 P.2d at 
543 (reviewing an anticipatory affidavit "as a whole and with a 'common sense' orientation, 
deferring to the magistrate's decision"). Thus, once police were lawfully inside pursuant to 
the warrant authorizing a search for mushrooms and other controlled substances, see R84, 
add. A, they properly searched for medication from defendant's defunct clinic. 
C. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to make futile 
challenges to the anticipatory search warrant's validity. 
In Point 11(B), (C)(2), and (D), of his brief, defendant argues that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to argue that (1) "the triggering events necessary to the validity of the 
warrant did not occur" because "[t]he re-searching of the named persons and locations clearly 
did not take place before the warrant was executed," and (2) the warrant "was completely 
void of information concerning the CI." Aplt. Br. at 30-32, 34-36. Thus, defendant broadly 
concludes, "the warrant affidavit failed to establish probable cause to search [defendant's] 
residence." Because these challenge were futile, defendant's ineffectiveness claims fail. 
1. Re-searching Lisa, the undercover DEA agent, and their 
vehicle was not a necessary prerequisite to the anticipatory 
search warrant's validity. 
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As set forth in Point 11(A), supra, a common sense reading of the search warrant 
affidavit identifies defendant's acceptance of the mushrooms as the key event necessary to 
establish probable cause to believe that he in fact possessed the mushrooms; therefore, it was 
the only triggering event which would justify the warrant's execution. See R480-481, add. 
E. Although the warrant can arguably be read to require that Lisa, the undercover DEA 
agent, and their vehicle be re-searched prior to the warrant's execution, that requirement 
added nothing to the probable cause established once police overheard defendant accept the 
mushrooms. See R501 :Exh. # 8 at 3. Thus, even if the affidavit is reasonably read to require 
that the "re-search" occur prior to the warrant's execution, that requirement is effectively 
obviated by the salient fact that probable cause—and the warrant's validity—was previously 
established by defendant's recorded acceptance of the mushrooms. See R481, add. E. 
Therefore, any objection to the search warrant on this ground would have been futile and 
defendant was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to raise it. See State v. Whittle, 1999 
UT 96, f^ 34,989 P.2d 52 (holding that the "failure of counsel to make motions or objections 
which would be futile if raised does not constitute ineffective assistance") (quotations and 
citations omitted). 
2. The fair inference from the affidavit is that the CI was a 
clinic employee and family friend uniquely situated to 
observe defendant's drug-related indiscretions. 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the 
search warrant affidavit because "there is absolutely no information about the CI provided" 
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therein. Aplt. Br. at 34-36. Defendant's assertion of ineffectiveness is meritless and should 
therefore be rejected. 
Even before Lisa was identified as the confidential informant here, the first-hand 
observations detailed in the search warrant affidavit gave rise to the fair inference that the 
informant had unique access to the inner workings of defendant's clinic and personal 
knowledge of his home-life. Indeed, the first paragraph details defendant's drug-related 
indiscretions at the clinic including the questionable procuring and sharing of prescriptive 
medicine, some of which came up missing on two different occasions, and his apparent drug-
related impairment at the clinic. See R86, add. A. Moreover, defendant's girlfriend shared 
personal first-hand information with the informant that "they were closing early the next day 
because she and [defendant] were going to do mushrooms." Id. Finally, the affidavit includes 
excerpts from a recorded conversation between the informant and defendant at defendant's 
residence wherein defendant twice offered to purchase any "extra" mushrooms the 
informant's brother may have available. Id. 
Based on the above, the affidavit is more than adequate to establish Lisa's veracity 
and reliability as the confidential informant. First, while Lisa's identity was not expressly 
revealed in the affidavit, police knew with whom they working. Thus, Lisa's reliability is 
buttressed by the fact that the police could verify her information and that she may be subject 
to penalty if the information was false. See State v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, f 15,40 P.3d 
1136; City of St. George v. Carter, 945 P.2d 165, 169 (Utah App. 1997). See also 3 Wayne 
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.4 at 204 (3rd ed. 1996) ("Courts are much more concerned 
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with veracity when the source of the information is an informant from the criminal milieu 
rather than an average citizen who has found himself in the position of a crime victim or 
witness"). 
Additionally, Lisa's information was based on first-hand observation and personal 
conversation, some recorded, with defendant and his girlfriend. R86, add. A. See Deluna, 
2001 UT App 401, Tf 13 (personal observations of informant sufficient to establish the 
informant's basis of knowledge); State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App. 1992) 
("Courts have . . . consistently approved the issuance of search warrants where the 
informant's knowledge is based on personal observation"). Lisa's first-hand observations 
of missing medicine and defendant's drug-related impairment at the clinic, and her 
conversation with defendant at his house about purchasing mushrooms are sufficiently 
detailed to provide a substantial basis for the magistrate's finding of probable cause to 
believe that mushrooms and other controlled substances would be located inside defendant's 
residence. Id. 
Police also corroborated Lisa's allegations when she wore a hidden recording device 
and actually recorded defendant discussing his past use of mushrooms and offering to 
purchase any "extra" mushrooms from Lisa's brother. See R86, add. A; R501 :Exh. # 7. See 
Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, f 20 (police "'may corroborate the tip either by observing the 
illegal activity or by finding [the material] facts substantially as described by the informant'") 
(quoting Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 236 (Utah App. 1997). 
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Given the above, any challenge to Lisa's or the informant's veracity and reliability 
was futile; therefore, defendant was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to do so. 
Whittle,1999 UT 96, \ 34. His ineffectiveness claim should therefore be rejected. 
D. Alternatively, the instant search was justified by probable 
cause and exigent circumstances. 
Even assuming the Court were to find the anticipatory search warrant was invalid, the 
search of defendant's residence was still justified on the alternative grounds of probable 
cause and exigent circumstances. See Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, f^ 20, 29 P.3d 1225 
(affirming on alternative ground apparent as a matter of law). Probable cause is established 
because defendant accepted hallucinogenic mushrooms from an undercover DEA agent; 
moreover, police knew defendant had been fired from the hospital for using drugs. See 
R501:Exh. ## 7-8. Seef e.g., United States v. Allen, 235 F.3d 482, 488 (10th Cir. 2000) 
("Probable cause . . . exists when an officer,... is led to a reasonable belief that an offense 
has been or is being committed by the suspect"). Exigent circumstances are established 
because the mushrooms defendant had just purchased and other controlled substances 
suspected to be inside his residence are easily consumed or destroyed. See United States v. 
Jones, 239 F.3d 716, 720 (5th Cir. 2001) ("The possibility that evidence will be removed or 
destroyed [is an] exigent circumstance[] that may excuse an otherwise unconstitutional 
intrusion into a residence"); Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265, 270-71 (4th Cir. 1998) ("[T]he 
doctrine of exigent circumstances basically encompasses officer safety and the destruction 
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of easily-disposed evidence"). See also State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258-60 (Utah 1987) 
(upholding warrantless entry to prevent suspects from flushing drugs down toilet). 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED DEFENDANT'S NEW 
TRIAL MOTION BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT ESTABLISH 
THAT THE STATE FAILED TO DISCLOSE MATERIAL 
INFORMATION ABOUT LISA'S COOPERATION OR THAT TRIAL 
COUNSEL PERFORMED INEFFECTIVELY IN NOT FURTHER 
PURSUING THIS LINE OF INQUIRY 
In Point III of his brief, defendant challenges the trial court's ruling denying the new 
trial motion in which he alleged a discovery violation for failure to reveal the conditions of 
Lisa's cooperation with the government, and alternatively, ineffective assistance of counsel 
for failing to investigate or explore the same. Aplt. Br. at 37-42. The trial court soundly 
rejected these claims. 
Proceedings Below. Trial counsel's opening statement referenced the "very violent 
crime" committed against Lisa by her husband, Gene. R506:52. Trial counsel stated that 
Gene was prosecuted for that offense and you'll (the jury) hear of the disposition of that 
prosecution." Id. Trial counsel also referenced Lisa's anger toward defendant, and her 
accusations against him which resulted in the government's solicitation of Lisa's help "to set 
[defendant] up." R506:52-53. Trial counsel further suggested that Lisa used her close 
friendship with defendant and Cindy to entrap defendant and that she did so "to further her 
cause with the government." R506:53-55. Trial counsel went so far as to suggest that it was 
Lisa who planted the drugs found during the warrant-supported search of his residence. 
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R506:56. Trial counsel concluded that the "government through its angry agent created a 
crime where there was no reason for a crime to occur." R506:58. 
On cross-examination, trial counsel explored Lisa's anger against defendant which 
resulted from his failed treatment of Gene's back pain. R506:90-93. Trial counsel elicited 
that Lisa was upset with defendant because she "had been begging [him] for help for months, 
and he didn't ever help." Id. Trial counsel specifically elicited that Lisa's husband was 
charged with felony assault against her, but was allowed to plead guilty to a reduced charge 
of brandishing a firearm. R506:92-93. Trial counsel also elicited that Lisa received 
approximately $500 from the DEA to cover her moving expenses. R506:109. 
During closing argument, trial counsel argued that Lisa used her friendship with 
defendant "to do what she need[ed] to do to benefit her cause and that of the government," 
including planting the Demerol and hydrocodone in defendant's residence and manipulating 
defendant into purchasing mushrooms. R508:38-39, 41, 43-45. 
The jury was instructed that they could "consider the interest which a witness has in 
the result of the trial and any bias or motive the witness may have to testify for or against 
either side." See R184, Jury Instruction # 12. 
As support for his new trial motion, defendant submitted an affidavit from trial 
counsel asserting that he first learned post-trial of Lisa's agreement with the State, that 
"Gene['s] charges would 'go away' if Lisa [] was willing to act as an informant and witness 
against [defendant]." R403. Trial counsel asserted that if he had "been provided the 
information regarding the deal between the State and Lisa [], [he] would have presented 
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evidence to the jury in regards to the deal and had the court instruct the jury relative to the 
reliability of Lisa['s] testimony." R404. 
Defendant also submitted post-trial depositions of Lisa and Gene taken in the civil 
case against defendant. R505:26. Appellate counsel quoted from Lisa's deposition, showing 
that she answered affirmatively when asked if the prosecutor "made it clear to [her] that if 
[she] would help them - - by them, I mean the government - - with their investigation of 
[defendant], that he would be willing to reduce the charge to basically make the charges 
against Gene go away." R505:28. 
Following the parties' arguments, the trial court rejected defendant's claim of a 
discovery violation or ineffective assistance in a written ruling. See R482-484, add. E. The 
trial court implicitly rejected trial counsel's affidavit, to find that trial counsel in fact "elicited 
testimony at trial that [Lisa's husband] was permitted to plead guilty" to a lesser offense and 
"that his plea was held in abeyance, with eventual dismissal if [Lisa's husband] complied 
with certain conditions unrelated to this case." R482, add. E. Based on this finding, the trial 
court concluded that trial counsel "knew of the disposition of the charges against [Lisa's 
husband]," and that he used this knowledge strategically to portray Lisa as "vindictive," 
"unreasonable ang[ry]" with defendant, and "ungrateful" for [defendant's] generosity." 
R483, add. E. The trial court found this strategy reasonable. Id. 
Failure to Marshall. On appeal, defendant purports to raise the discovery violation 
issue, claiming that "the State never disclosed to the defense the actual deal it had made with 
the State's main witness and informant, Lisa LaPlante." Aplt. Br. at 39. Defendant further 
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claims that trial counsel was not made aware "that the DEA had financially compensated" 
Lisa. Aplt. Br. at 40. As set forth above, the trial court found that trial counsel was aware 
of the charge against Gene and its disposition. In other words, the trial court found there was 
no discovery violation. R482-483, add. E. The trial court further found that trial counsel 
used this information strategically at trial. R482-483, add. E. In challenging this ruling, 
defendant makes no mention of trial counsel's opening statement, cross-examination of Lisa, 
or closing argument, all of which demonstrate trial counsel's strategic use of evidence of the 
disposition of Gene's felony assault charge, and the DEA's payment of Lisa's moving 
expenses. See Aplt. Br. at 37-42. In other words, defendant has not marshaled the evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings, see, e.g., R506:52-53, 56-58, 90-93, 109; R508:38-39, 
41, 43-45, let alone shown that it is inadequate to support the trial court's rejection of the 
claimed discovery violation. See West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co. ,818 P.2d 1311,1315 
(Utah App. 1991) ("In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists''). 
Defendant's claim of a discovery violation should be rejected on this ground alone. See State 
v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, f 13, 983 P.2d 556 (holding that where appellant makes no 
attempt to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's ruling, this Court "accepts the 
trial court's findings as stated in its ruling").7 
7Defendant also claims that the State failed to turn over "prepared reports of 
interviews with Angie Stoughton, Marie Packard, and pharmacist Mike Goyne." Aplt. 
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Effective Assistance. In any event, defendant expressly concedes that trial counsel 
in fact "questioned [Lisa] about the disposition of her husband's case in hopes that the jury 
would infer the plea arrangement was the result of [Lisa's] cooperation and testimony." Aplt. 
Br. at 41. Defendant complains that "trial counsel went no further, however, never inquiring 
as to whether there was a specific deal that had been made." Id. Thus, it appears that the crux 
of defendant's complaint is not so much an alleged discovery violation as it is the 
effectiveness of trial counsel. 
To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must 
demonstrate that trial counsel's representation was deficient and prejudicial. Parsons v. 
Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994). This Court "need not address both components if 
a defendant fails to meet his or her burden on either one." State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 
61 (Utah 1993). See also Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,697 (1984) ("If it is easier 
Br. at 42. Defendant alleges that the reports "contained material details about the 
government's investigation of Penn," but wholly fails to identify what these material 
details were. Id. The claim is therefore inadequately briefed and should be rejected. See 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988); see also State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 
966 (Utah 1989) (declining to address argument on the ground that defendant's brief 
"wholly lacks legal analysis and authority to support his argument"). Moreover, the trial 
court rejected this claim when it was raised in defendant's new trial motion. R483-484, 
add. E ("The Court has reviewed those written statements, and finds nothing there that 
would have helped [defendant] that was not presented to the jury"). Because defendant 
does not acknowledge the trial court's finding, let alone attempt to demonstrate any clear 
error therein, his claim may be rejected on this ground too. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, f 13. 
Finally, defendant's complaint that the Goyne interview was not turned over is raised for 
the first time on appeal. See R483, add. E. It is therefore unpreserved and, in the absence 
of a plain error or ineffective assistance claim, it is also procedurally barred. State v. 
Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995). 
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to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which 
we expect will often be so, that course should be followed"). 
Contrary to defendant's claims on appeal, and as set forth above, trial counsel in fact 
presented evidence of, and argued, Lisa's motivation to assist the government and her bias 
against defendant. See, e.g., R506:52-58, 90-93, 109; R508:38-39, 41, 43-45. Thus, 
defendant's complaint is no more than that trial counsel failed to make express what was 
already unavoidably implicit—that Lisa cooperated with the government in exchange for a 
favorable disposition of the felony charge against Gene. See Aplt. Br. at 41. That appellate 
counsel may propose an equally reasonable strategy, i.e., making this unavoidable inference 
express, is insufficient to overcome the heavy presumption that trial counsel acted 
reasonably. See Parsons, 871 P.2dat 524 (quoting State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059,1063 (Utah 
1991)). 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO OBJECT UNDER RULES 402, 403 AND 
404(b), UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, TO EVIDENCE OF HIS DRUG-
RELATED MISDEEDS AND HE HAS NOT ARGUED PLAIN ERROR 
OR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE ON APPEAL; THEREFORE, HIS 
CLAIMS ARE UNPRESERVED AND PROCEDURALLY BARRED 
In Point IV of his brief, defendant asserts that the "trial court erred in allowing highly 
prejudicial and unsubstantiated allegations of prior drug use, distribution, inferred 
'prescription fraud,' and other allegations over the objection of defense counsel." Aplt. Br. 
at 43. Defendant identifies ten instances where this "bad acts" evidence was allegedly 
admitted in violation of Utah Rules of Evidence 402,403, and 404(b). Aplt. Br. at 43 n.19, 
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44 (citing R506:64-66, 136, 149, 153; R507:70-71). But trial counsel arguably timely 
objected only twice, and then only on relevance grounds. See R506:64-66, 136, 149, 153; 
R507:70-71. The great bulk of defendant's claims, including all of his claims of error under 
rules 404(b) and 403, are thus unpreserved. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,1f 11,10 P.3d 346; 
State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358,361 (Utah App. 1993). Because defendant argues neither plain 
error or ineffective assistance of counsel these claims are also procedurally barred. State v. 
Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995). Finally, while defendant arguably timely 
preserved relevancy challenges to evidence of his suicide attempts and prior mushroom use, 
he fails to demonstrate any abuse of the trial court's discretion or that this evidence was 
unfairly prejudicial. 
Proceedings Below. On the first day of trial, 20 November 2002, defendant filed a 
motion in limine broadly objecting to "irrelevant statements made by informant, Lisa 
LaPlante pursuant to Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence." R139 (a copy of the motion is 
contained in addendum H). Without identifying any specific statement, defendant 
complained that "many" of Lisa's statements in the police reports "describing her interactions 
and observations of [defendant in his medical practice were "either irrelevant, or if deemed 
irrelevant," "unduly prejudicial." Id Trial counsel at no time asked the trial court to rule on 
the broad-based motion in limine before or during trial. 
Rather, during opening statements, trial counsel referenced Lisa's accusations that 
defendant was "illegally prescribing, illegally dealing, if you will, controlled substances, 
Oxycontin." R506:53. Essentially characterizing Lisa's accusations as lies, trial counsel told 
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the jury that they would "never hear, because it didn't occur, any evidence that in fact that 
occurred at all." Id. According to trial counsel, Lisa made the accusations after becoming 
"upset with defendant," and that she was recruited by the government to "set [defendant] up." 
R506:52-53. 
Approximately eight of the ten instances of alleged "bad acts" testimony about which 
defendant complains on appeal were introduced without objection from trial counsel. For 
example, trial counsel did not object: 
• when Lisa was asked to give an example of behavior which caused her to think 
"[defendant] was using controlled substances,"and Lisa related finding 
defendant once "in the back room sleeping," with "a tourniquet. . and bent 
needles on the floor." R506:65. 
• when Lisa continued that there were other "times [defendant] just was acting 
weird all day, walking almost into walls. Be doing his dictation at night and 
not recall who had seen or why, and he had to be reminded by office staff." Id. 
• when Lisa was asked why she had stated, "that [she] had to move, had to leave 
Moab," and Lisa responded, "[b]ecause there was a lot of people addicted to 
OxyContin in town, and now their source for that OxyContin was gone, and 
I feared for me and my family." R506:135-136. 
• when Lisa was asked what was causing her husband to "lo[se] his mind," and 
Lisa responded, "The OxyContin." R506:136. Nor did trial counsel object to 
the prosecutor's follow up question, to which Lisa responded affirmatively: 
"That [defendant] had given him?" Id. 
when the prosecutor elicited from Agent Johnson that the "DEA's concern [] 
is if [defendant's] doing illegal drugs, and he's treating patients, that there's 
a public safety issue there." R506:149. 
• when Johnson further testified of defendant's questionable practices: "[Ojther 
types of controlled substances [] were obtained by writing prescriptions in 
office staff members' names and having them bring drugs back to [defendant]. 
Those drugs may have been shared with office staff members, and also he may 
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have been taking them himself. Our concern was he was using them to treat 
patients." Id. 
• when Johnson was asked why the DEA sought an anticipatory warrant: "[W]e 
had some concerns with what would happen to the evidence if we . . . had to 
wait an hour or two to go get the warrant, and we were afraid that some of it 
might be ingested, which we didn't want him to do to cause him any harm, and 
also any evidence might have been destroyed from that time that we made the 
transaction to the time we could have gotten the warrant." R506:152-153. 
• to the prosecutor's cross-examination of Cindy, or her affirmative response, 
that she recalled hearing defendant tell Lisa that he had been fired from the 
hospital because of his drug use. R507:71. 
Waiver and Procedural Ban Based on trial counsel's non-objections set forth 
above, defendant has failed to preserve his claims of error with regard to any of the above 
evidence. Defendant's broad-based motion in limine (filed the first day of trial and never 
ruled upon by the trial court), was wholly inadequate to alert the judge that defendant 
objected on relevance, or any other grounds, to this evidence which defendant specifically 
identifies for the first time on appeal. See R139, add. H. "Utah courts require specific 
objections in order 'to bring all claimed errors to the trial court's attention to give the court 
an opportunity to correct the errors if appropriate/" Brown, 856 P.2d at 361 (quotation 
omitted). See also Holgate, 2000 UT 74, If 11 0"[T]he trial court ought to be given an 
opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it.'") (quoting State v. 
Eldredge, 713 P.2d 29,36 (Utah 1989)). "This specificity requirement arises out of the trial 
court's need to assess allegations by isolated relevant facts and considering them in the 
context of the specific legal doctrine placed at issue. For this reason, a general objection may 
be insufficient to preserve a specific substantive issue for appeal." Brown, 856 P.2d at 361 
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(citing State v. Elm. 808 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1991); State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 820-
821 (Utah 1989); State v. Johnson, 11'4 P.2d 1141, 1144-1145 (Utah 1989)). Accordingly, 
because the trial court had no opportunity to consider the alleged errors identified above, 
defendant's claims are unpreserved. Brown, 856 P.2d at 361; Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f^ 11. 
Because defendant argues neither plain error nor ineffective assistance his claims are also 
procedurally barred. Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229. 
Even if the broad-based motion in limine is deemed sufficient to preserve at most a 
relevance challenge to the above evidence, defendant failed to obtain a ruling on the motion 
in limine, thus the relevance issues are still unpreserved. See State v. Ortiz, 782 P.2d 959, 
961 (Utah App. 1989) ("Where the court has not a made a ruling on a motion in limine, and 
where defendant fails to invoke a ruling on his motion, he has waived the issue for purposes 
of appeal"). But see, State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, ^  43 n.7, 27 P.3d 1115 (declining to apply 
Ortiz where trial court actually ruled on an unpreserved issue, albeit on a different ground 
than that argued by the appellant). 
* * * 
While it is arguable whether trial counsel raised timely relevance objections to 
evidence that he had attempted suicide and had also previously used mushrooms, the trial 
court addressed these claims. Specifically, the prosecutor inquired, without objection, if Lisa 
noticed "any aberrant behavior of [defendant]? R506:64. Lisa said "[t]here were several 
times that he had tried to commit suicide. There were occasions where - - " Id. At which 
point, trial counsel objected on relevance grounds. Id. The prosecutor responded that the 
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"relevance is that the behavior and later statements made to the defendant led the witness to 
believe that he was using controlled substances." R506:65. The trial court stated: "Let's keep 
rolling." Id. 
The prosecutor then asked Lisa "[w]hat else" she had observed? Id. As set forth 
above, Lisa told, without objection, of finding defendant sleeping in the back room on one 
occasion with a tourniquet and bent needles on the floor, and of observing defendant walk 
into walls and have trouble with his dictation. Id. The prosecutor further inquired, without 
objection, if Lisa was aware of defendant and Cindy "taking hallucinogenic mushrooms?" 
R506:65. Lisa responded that "Cindy had told [her] that on one occasion." Id. Trial counsel 
objected on hearsay grounds only after the prosecutor's follow-up question, "When was 
that?" Id. The prosecutor explained that the evidence "provided the basis for why this matter 
was brought to the attention of the DEA and why hallucinogenic mushrooms in particular 
ever came up." R506:66. The trial court allowed it for that "limited purpose." Id. The 
prosecutor then elicited that Lisa remembered 
sitting at [her] desk, and Cindy said, we're going to be closed tomorrow, which 
I believe was like on a Wednesday or something like that and she said that 
they had some mushrooms, and they were going to take the day off and go do 
mushrooms. I remember specifically because I swung around in my chair and 
said, 'what?' 
Id 
Based on the above, the trial court arguably sustained defendant's relevancy objection 
to evidence of his (defendant's) attempts at suicide. See R506:64-65. Indeed, the prosecutor 
ceased questioning Lisa about defendant's suicide attempts. Id. Assuming the trial court 
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sustained defendant's relevancy objection, trial counsel failed to ask the trial court to strike 
the evidence, which would have cured any arguable prejudice here. See Mead, 2001 UT 58, 
Tf 50 (holding that trial court's striking of testimony was "sufficient to dispel any prejudice 
occasioned by the improper statement"). As defendant claims neither ineffective assistance 
or plain error with regard to the failure to strike the evidence, such a claim is now 
procedurally barred. Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229. 
On the other hand, if the trial court's ruling is fairly read to overrule defendant's 
relevancy objection to evidence of his suicide attempts, defendant suffered no prejudice. 
Even assuming the suicide evidence was erroneously admitted, given the weight of the 
evidence against defendant, including his mishandling and misplacing of prescription drugs 
at the clinic, see, e.g., R506:62-65, the discovery of drugs and mushrooms in his residence, 
see R506:157,159, and his recorded statements describing his prior mushroom use (including 
at the clinic), explaining that he was fired from the hospital for using drugs, offering to buy 
psilocin mushrooms, and actually buying the mushrooms, the jury did not convict defendant 
because he was also suicidal. R501:Exh. ## 7-8. See State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 500 
(Utah 1986) (erroneous limitation on cross-examination as to victim's possible motive in 
testifying held non-prejudicial "because additional cross-examination would not have had 
a substantial influence in bringing about a different verdict"). 
As for defendant's complaint about evidence that he and Cindy had previously 
ingested mushrooms, defendant fails to demonstrate any abuse of the trial court's discretion 
in ruling that this evidence was relevant and admissible for the "limited purpose"of 
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demonstrating why defendant came to the DEA's attention in the first place and why he was 
offered hallucinogenic mushrooms as opposed to another controlled substance. R506:65-66. 
See State v. Martin. 2002 UT 34, Tf 34, 44 P.3d 805. Indeed, this evidence was relevant to 
refute defendant's defense of entrapment, or that he did not intend to consume the 
mushrooms he was recorded offering to buy and then in fact purchased. See, e.g., R506:51-
58;R507:128-130, 137-141; R508:37, 42-47; R501:Exh. ## 7-8. See State v. Jaeger, 1999 
UT 1, <H 13, 973 P.2d 404 (recognizing "because the standard for determining whether 
evidence is relevant is so low, the issue of whether evidence is relevant is rarely an issue")-
Thus, defendant's complaint lacks merit and should therefore be rejected. 
POINT V 
DEFENDANT CANNOT SHOW THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS 
INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT RAISING A MIRANDA ISSUE WHERE 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO PROVIDE SUPPORTING CITATION 
TO THE RECORD; CONSEQUENTLY, HIS CLAIM IS 
INADEQUATELY BRIEFED 
In Point V of his brief defendant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to raise a Miranda issue below.8 Aplt. Br. at 47-48. While defendant cites multiple Miranda 
authorities, and even identifies factors to be considered in determining custody for Miranda 
purposes, his brief wholly fails to identify where in the record a statement of defendant 
obtained in alleged violation of Miranda was admitted at trial. See Aplt. Br. at 47-48, His 
claim is therefore inadequately briefed and should be rejected on that ground. 
lSee Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides that the argument portion 
of an appellant's brief "shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented,... with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the 
record relied on" (emphasis added). Under this rule, Utah appellate courts have consistently 
declined to address inadequately briefed issues because "a reviewing court is entitled to have 
the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in 
which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research." State v. Bishop, 
753 P.2d 439,450 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted); see also State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 
966 (Utah 1989) (declining to address argument on the ground that defendant's brief "wholly 
lacks legal analysis and authority to support his argument"). 
Here, defendant's analysis is devoid of citation to the record, let alone record citation 
to evidence of a statement obtained in violation of Miranda and admitted at trial. See Aplt. 
Br. at 47-48. While defendant's Statement of Facts includes a paragraph with the heading: 
Facts Relating to Miranda Violation, see Aplt. Br. at 17 (citing R502, Exh. #6 and R506:175-
183), the record citation therein fails to pinpoint the admission of a statement obtained in 
alleged violation of Miranda and admitted at trial. First, R502:Exh. #6 is a part-trial 
deposition of DEA agent Robert Johnson submitted as an exhibit with defendant's motion 
for new trial. Even if the deposition supported defendant's blanket assertion of a Miranda 
violation, it does not demonstrate where in the trial record the alleged statement was 
admitted or that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to get the statement excluded. 
Second, while R506:176-183 is a citation to the trial record, it is similarly unavailing because 
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the citation is to an in camera discussion of the admissibility of defendant's volunteered 
statements made post-Miranda. Thus, it similarly fails to demonstrate where in the trial 
record the alleged statement was admitted, or that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 
get the statement excluded. 
Based on the above, defendant's claim of ineffectiveness appears to be speculative 
and should therefore be rejected. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, U 17, 12 P.3d 92 
("Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting 
therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively"). 
* * * 
Even assuming defendant's brief is deemed adequate, trial counsel was not 
ineffective. To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance, defendant must demonstrate 
that defense counsel's representation was deficient and prejudicial. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 
P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994). This Court "need not address both components if a defendant 
fails to meet his or her burden on either one." State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 61 (Utah 
1993). See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 693, 697 (1984) ("If it is easier to 
dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we 
expect will often be so, that course should be followed"). 
Defendant's fact statement arguably suggests his complaint is with the admission of 
his statement to police that the could find the mushrooms in his kitchen. See Aplt. Br. at 17. 
Johnson testified that defendant showed police where to find the mushrooms. See, e.g., 
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R506:157, 172. Assuming both that this is the evidence about which defendant complains, 
and that it was obtained in violation of Miranda, it was hardly prejudicial. 
The State's view is consistent with the trial court's rejection of defendant's new trial 
motion. The trial court rejected defendant's claim of ineffective assistance because (1) "it 
was not obvious that [defendant] was in custody at the time he was asked about the location 
of the drugs," and (2) defendant suffered no prejudice "from admission of his pre-Miranda 
statements." R482, add. E. The trial court's correct ruling should be upheld. 
Regardless of whether defendant was in custody when he directed police to the 
mushrooms, this evidence was not prejudicial. First, evidence that defendant assisted the 
police to locate the mushrooms they had just overheard him purchasing was not inconsistent 
with his defense of entrapment, or lack of intent to ingest the mushrooms. See, e.g., 
R506:51-58;R507:124-131,137-141;R505:35-47. Second, thejury already knew defendant 
was recorded discussing his prior mushroom experiences, offering to buy any "extra" 
mushrooms, and ultimately buying the mushrooms at issue here. See R501:Exh. ## 7-8. 
Thus, thejury did not convict defendant solely because he told police where he had put the 
mushrooms he just purchased. See State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 500 (Utah 1986) 
(erroneous limitation on cross-examination as to victim's possible motive in testifying held 
non-prejudicial "because additional cross-examination would not have had a substantial 
influence in bringing about a different verdict"). Because he cannot show prejudice here, see 
R482, add. E, defendant cannot demonstrate ineffectiveness and his claim of such should be 
rejected. Germonto, 868 P.2d at 61; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 
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POINT VI 
THERE IS NO CUMULATIVE ERROR REQUIRING REVERSAL 
In his last point, defendant argues that the cumulative error doctrine applies here. 
Aplt. Br. at 48. Under that doctrine, even if the alleged errors do not individually warrant 
reversal, this Court will reverse if "'the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines 
[its] confidence that a fair trial was had.'" State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8,1{ 44, 994 P.2d 177 
(quoting State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 277 (Utah 1998)). For the reasons already argued, 
defendant fails to show any error occurred; thus, the Court need not consider whether the 
cumulative effect of these actions undermines confidence in the outcome. Id 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's jury convictions for possession of psilocin, hydrocodone and Demerol 
should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on / 2 . February 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
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) Criminal No. 
) SEARCH WARRANT 
HE STATE OF UTAH TO AJNY ENFORCEMENT OFFICER IN THE COUNTY' OF 
RAND, STATE OF UTAH 
Proof by affidavit was made "before me this day by 
Investigator Rob Johnson that there is probable cause for 
Issuance of an anticipatory search warrant, as more fully set 
forth in the affidavit on file with the Court. 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to make immediate search 
AT ANYTIME OF THE DAY OR NIGHT, WITHOUT NOTICE OR ANNOUNCING 
ENTRY, of: a single residence dwelling located at 300 East 300 
South, Moab, Grand County, Utah, further described as a 
ft white sided wtth green trim house, grey shingles, two doors 
facing north, the door to the east is a green screen door, the 
door to the west is an aluminum screen door, red brick chimney on 
east side of home, the numbers 300 are by the ease door, there is 
1 
I 
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& driveway on the west side with an aluminum hut over the 
driveway. 
To search for the following, controlled substances, 
including/ but not limited to, psilocybm mushrooms and/or 
controlled substances 
This search warrant is valid only upon the occurence of 
the events described in the affidavit for this anticipatory 
Search warrant. 
If you find any of the property described above, or any 
part thereof, bring it before me immediately at this court as 
required by UCA 77-23-207. 
You are authorized to execute this search warrant, AT 
XNY TIME DURING THE DAY OR NIGHT, WITHOUT NOTICE OR ANNOUNCING 
^NTRY, of your authority and purpose 
TIME: L) $i- r >r SATE '»I,. . 
Judge v# a 
2 
01 3Wd A U T i a * mi AAC\ Mtn qq/ryflCQPt? V7:flT 7QC\7 /flS/Qfl 
AFF DAVIT 
UCA 7 7-23-1 et seq and UCA 53-37-10 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) S3 . 
bounty oC Grand ) 
The investigator undersigned, being duly sworn, states 
on oath the following: 
1. OFFICER, Your affiant is Diversion Investigator 
Rob Johnson of the Drug Enforcement Administration Your affiant 
is an investigator specifically assigned to investigate thfe 
diversion of legally manufactured controlled substances mpo an 
Illegal market. Your aJfiant has been an investigator m this 
specific field for ibouu 13 years. Your affiant has been 
involved in numerous investigations. 
2. PROPERTY. I request a search warrant to search a 
Pmgle residence dwelling located at 300 East 300 South, Mpab, 
Grand County, Utah, further described as a white sided with green 
trim house, grey shingles, two doors facing north, the doot to 
the east is a graen screen door, the door to the west is an 
aluminum screen door, red brick chimney on east side of home, che 
pumbers 300 are by the east door, there is a driveway on the west 
side with an aluminum hut over the driveway. Said residence is 
wichm a drug free zone. 
Your affiant requests this search warrant to look for 
the following; controlled substances, including, but not limited 
to, psilocybin mushrooms and narcotics. 
3. LOCATION. I have probable cause to believe the 
above described property may be located in the residence 
described above. 
4. GROUNDS. I have probable cause to believe there 
pxists evidence of the crimes of Possession of a Controlled 
Substance and/or Unlawful Distribution of a Controlled Substance, 
and within a drug free zone. 
1 
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5. PROBABLE CAUSE and INFORMATION. 
On January 21, 2002, CI gave a statement Co law 
enforcement outlining Dr. Penn's improper use of his DEA license 
ii prescribing narcotics. CI said when a prescription is filled 
under a staff member's name, it is shared with Dr. Penn and, other 
spaff. CI said narcotics are left out on Dr. Penn's shelf pr in 
his desk drawer or filing cabinet. CI said Dr. Penn has seen 
patients while he was under the influence of narcotics and to the 
extent Chat staff members had to remind him of why he saw the 
patients so he could dictate because he could not remember., CI 
S£id pharmacies often call because prescriptions are wrong -or are 
written for the wrong amounts or doses. CI said one patient had 
mfed boxes in the office and the medications were gone before they 
should have been, so to make up for the missing meds, Dr. Penn 
called in a new prescription with an increase in dosage. 01 said 
Dr. Penn sent out letters stating he would no longer prescribe 
oxycontin, but yet he continued to prescribe oxycontin. CI said 
a; patient brought in five Duragesic patches and four came up 
missing. On January 30, 2002f CI said Cindy Drew told her [that 
fcfrey were closing errly the next day because she and Dr. Penn 
wjere going to do mushrooms. The DEA was contacted with this 
information. 
Approximately two weeks ago, CI was in the residence 
described above as 300 East 300 South, Moab, Grand County, Utah, 
and saw some multi-dose vials of Demerol in their refrigerator 
01 also saw some .oxycontin m a prescription bottle, Labeled with 
the name of Robert Silver, in the bathroom. 
On April 19, 2002, CI was wired by agents and CI went 
tio the above described residence. CI asked Penn and Drew ibout 
tihe side effects of using mushrooms. CI said CI' s brother'had 
dome mushrooms that CI was considering trying. Penn and Direw 
gave CI their opinion of how safe mushrooms were and said j^t was 
good. They described how mushrooms would make CI feel which was 
based on their past experience of using mushrooms. Penn then 
4aid to CI It he stocked any extra.,we' 11 buy it. Drew Chen said 
tjhey got theirs from the northwest. Penn then said again, J If 
he's got any extra, I'll buy some from him, Penn then saitf, 
enough for two of us. Drew then said, Well, I'll buy some, for 
/pave too, cuz I owe Dav2 a favor and he wanted some. 
2 
Dr. Nathaniel Perm and Cindy Drew live together in the 
4bove described residence and said residence is within a drug 
ftree zone. 
6 ANTICIPATORY INFORMATION On April 20, 2002, 
between 1000 and noon, DEA agents will meet with CI. CI azjid an 
undercover agent (UC) will be searched and CI will be wire<£ CI 
<3>r UC will be given som* psllocybin mushrooms. CI • s vehicle will 
also be searched. CI and an undercover agent will drive ih CI s 
Vehicle to the above described residence of Penn and Drew ^ ith 
the mushrooms Agents will have CI and UC under visual and audio 
observation at all times driving to and from said residence. 
they will have CI and UC under audio observation while they are 
\n the residence. It is anticipated that CI and UC will offer 
Penn and/or Drew the mushrooms for sale for either cash an£/or 
controlled substance prescriptions After CI and UC leave- the 
residence, CI and UC and CI's vehicle will be re-searched ' 
Your affiant, is requesting this warrant be a no-knock^ 
warrant, to be served at any time of the night or day, for the 
ireason your affiant firmly believes it is safer for police1 
officers, participants and non-participants to the operation if 
the officers have the safety of an unannounced entry Further 
there is an extremely high risk of the potential disposal and/or 
concealment of drugs by the occupants prior to an announced entry 
by the police. 
DATE: t-j/ri/cl-
TIME: Ll ^?/r>i 
SIGNED N^^yr. " r / f sm» ^ 
Irivelstigator Rob Johnson 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN co before me this ' ' day of 
April, 2002. 
Judge ' ~ -
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Addendum B 
irtgory G. Skordas (#3865) 
GUSTIN, CHRISTIAN, SKORDAS 
& CASTON, L.L.C. 
Suite 810 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7444 
Facsimile: (801) 531-8885 
Attorneys for Defendant 
In the Seventh Judicial District Court 
In and For Grand County, State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
NATHANIEL FREDERICK PENN, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 021700103 
Judge Lyle Anderson 
The Defendant, Nathaniel Frederick Penn, by and through his attorney of record, Gregory 
G. Skordas, hereby moves this court to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the anticipatory 
search warrant. This motion is based on the reasons in the Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to Suppress filed herewith. 
DATED this S day of J^OC/^W , 2002. 
Gustin, Christian, Skordas & Caston, L.L.C. 
Gr^biNfu. Skordas 
Gregory G. Skordas (#3865) 
GUSTIN, CHRISTIAN, SKORDAS 
& CASTON, L.L.C. 
Suite 810 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7444 
Facsimile: (801) 531-8885 
Attorneys for Defendant 
In the Seventh Judicial District Court 
In and For Grand County, State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
NATHANIEL FREDERICK PENN, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 021700103 
Judge Lyle Anderson 
The Defendant, Nathaniel Frederick Penn, by and through his attorney of record, Gregory 
G. Skordas, hereby submits this Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress the 
evidence seized pursuant to the anticipatory search warrant. 
BACKGROUND 
On January 21,2002, a confidential informant, ("CI") gave a statement to law 
enforcement alleging that the Defendant was misusing his medical license by illegally 
prescribing and misusing narcotics. The CI alleged that when a prescription was filled under a 
staff member's name, it was shared with the Defendant and other staff. The CI further alleged 
that the Defendant would treat patients while he was under the influence of narcotics. The CI 
claimed to have observed vials of Demerol in the Defendant's refrigerator and some Oxycontin 
in a prescription bottle, labeled with the name of Robert Silver in the bathroom of the 
Defendant's home. 
The CI was wired by agents and went to the Defendant's residence. While there, the CI 
asked Defendant and co-defendant, Cynthia Drew, about the side effects of using mushrooms. 
The CI stated that she had access to mushrooms and was considering trying them. The 
Defendant and co-defendant allegedly told the CI of their experiences and the affects of 
mushrooms and that they were willing to purchase some mushrooms if the CI's source had any 
extra. 
Based on this information, the police obtained an anticipatory search warrant (Attached 
as Exhibit A). The affidavit included the aforementioned, as well as "Anticipatory Information" 
contained in paragraph 6. The "Anticipatory Information" stated that the CI and DEA agent were 
going to go to the Defendant's home and attempt to sell him mushrooms and would thereafter 
have illegal substances in his possession. 
The next day, the CI brought her source, an undercover DEA agent posing as CI's 
brother, to the Defendant's home and introduced them. (See Transcript, attached as Exhibit A) 
The undercover agent then told the Defendant that he "brought some." He shows the Defendant 
what he brought, and said, "I don't have any that you're interested in?" The undercover agent 
then offered to make a trade with the Defendant for "Lortabs or something," to which the 
Defendant refused. The undercover agent finally ended up selling some mushrooms to the 
Defendant. 
2 
The Defendant's home was subsequently searched pursuant to the search warrant. The 
items seized included the mushrooms sold to the Defendant by the DEA agent, a prescription 
bottle under the name of Robert Silver, a patient of the Defendant's, and a multi-dose bottle of 
Demerol. 
ARGUMENT 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, section 14 of the 
Utah State Constitution both delineate a person's right to be free from an unreasonable search or 
seizure. Article 1, section 14 of the Utah State Constitution states that a people have the right "to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects" and that "no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized." Therefore, there must be probable cause for a belief that 
the item sought is in the place to be searched. 
Utah's definition of "probable cause" is "a 4fair probability' that evidence of the crime 
will be found in the place or places name in the warrant." State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 
1260 (Utah 1993). At the time the warrant was sought, there was no probable cause that the 
Defendant had engaged in any wrongdoing or that there was evidence of any crime in the 
residence. While the affidavit does include a statement that the CI observed Demerol and 
Oxycotin in the Defendant's home, these items are not per se illegal and therefore an improper 
basis for the search warrant. 
There are two general requirements for a valid anticipatory search warrant: "(1) that it be 
supported by probable cause and (2) that the warrant or supporting affidavit clearly set out 
conditions precedent to the warrant's execution." United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 
3 
1201 (10th Cir. 1998). Probable cause to support anticipatory warrants in conditioned "on the 
occurrence of certain expected or 'triggering' events, typically the future delivery, sale, or 
purchase of contraband." Id. While assessing the probability that certain triggering events will 
occur, "the magistrate must also evaluate the probability that, following the triggering events, the 
evidence will be in the named place when the search warrant is executed." State v. Womack. 967 
P.2d 536, 543 (Ut. Ct. App. 1998). 
The magistrate must not "abandon the juristic role of assessing probable cause by 
depending on police guarantees that the search will not be done unless there is probable cause." 
Id. at 544. The police must show, on existing facts, that the evidence to be confiscated will be at 
the named place when the search occurs. There must be a "trustworthy assurance" that the 
contraband will "almost certainly" be located in the place described at the time of the search. 
Rowland. 145 F.3d at 1202-03. 
There was no such guarantee that the contraband described in the search warrant affidavit 
would be at the Defendant's home. There was no more than mere speculation that the Defendant 
would purchase the mushrooms from the DEA agent and therefore have them in his possession.1 
There was not sufficient probable cause for the issuance of this warrant, thereby making it 
invalid. Without a valid warrant supported by probable cause, the search is illegal and the fruits 
of such must be suppressed. 
'Paragraph 6 of the warrant affidavit states, "It is anticipated that CI and UC will offer 
Penn and/or Drew the mushrooms for sale for either cash and/or controlled substance 
prescriptions." There is no statement or assurance that the Defendant would purchase the 
substance or that he would subsequently anything in his possession. 
4 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should suppress the evidence seized in the Defendants 
home pursuant to the invalid search warrant. 
DATED this S day of S t p n ^ V , 2002. 
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1 Oc tober 30, 2002 
2 P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 THE COURT: Please be seated. Okay. We're 
4 sitting in chambers for Grand County in the case of 
5 State of Utah v. Nathaniel Penn, 0217103. Thank you, 
6 Mr. Benge, for agreeing to come up here for this hearing 
7 today. And, Mr. Skordas, it was less of a sacrifice for 
8 you, but thank you for agreeing as well. 
9 As I understand it, we have a motion to sever, 
10 a motion to suppress, a motion to change venue and a 
11 notice of intent to raise the affirmative defense of 
12 entrapment that need to be addressed today. Is that--is 
13 that all of them? 
14 MR. BENGE: Well, Your Honor, I think the 
15 motion to sever is moot, as we settled the case 
16 involving the co-defendant. 
17 THE COURT: I notice that Ms. Drew's case is 
18 scheduled for change of plea on November 6th. And 
19 assuming she does, then of course it will be moot. 
20 MR. BENGE: And then, Your Honor, maybe to make 
21 matters a little bit more swift, we, on behalf of the 
22 State, are not resisting the motion for change of venue. 
23 We concur in that motion and think that that would be 
24 appropriate. 
25 THE COURT: Do you have any suggestions about 
1 where we should send the case? 
2 MR. BENGE: Well, I don't think San Juan County 
3 would be a whole lot better inasmuch as Dr. Penn has 
4 practiced medicine there. I would suggest Carbon or 
5 Emery, Your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. Kind of where I would go. 
7 Probably Carbon is easier. I don't suppose you have--
8 you know about the availability of courtrooms here on 
9 November 2 0th through the 22nd? 
10 THE CLERK: I could certainly check for you, 
11 Judge. November 20th? Judge Halliday has oral 
12 arguments, but it looks like Judge Bryner's courtroom 
13 would be available. 
14 THE COURT: How about the next two days after 
15 that? 
16 THE CLERK: Judge Bryner has hearings that day, 
17 but Judge Halliday's courtroom here would be available. 
18 THE COURT: So we can bounce back and forth 
19 between courtrooms? 
20 THE CLERK 
21 THE COURT 
22 THE CLERK 
Uh-huh, at least the following day, 
And then the next one, the 22nd? 
The 22nd? It looks like we have 
23 I court in both courtrooms, but I do believe Judge 
24 Johansen's courtroom would be available. 
25 MR. SKORDAS: Your Honor, could I interrupt 
briefly? I have a matter, and the judge in this other 
case knows about my conflict, but a Judge in Summit 
County has scheduled an in-custody rape trial for this 
same week, starting November 20th, with the knowledge 
that I had this trial previously set. It was Judge 
Hilder, now Judge Lubeck. 
One way or the other, I'm going to have to 
postpone or continue one of the two cases. I certainly 
have no problem putting this to the next week or 
whatever. Judges often, as you know, set knowing that 
cases resolve, and that's, I think, what happened here. 
I actually have three trials to begin on the 20th, but 
one of them will not be a problem. 
THE CLERK: We have courtrooms available on the 
26th and the 27th, as well as the 28th. 
THE COURT: During Thanksgiving. 
THE CLERK: Oh. 
THE COURT: You know, the problem for me is if 
we go--if we change from this date, we're going to be 
looking at a new year, and several months in the future. 
And so--if Judge Lubeck really wants--if he--if his case 
has to go and my case has to go, I guess he's going to 
have to call me and persuade me that I should reschedule 
my previously-scheduled case because his case involves 
someone in custody. But I'm going to hold my ground 
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1 until he calls me and convinces me of that. 
2 We'll have a courtroom one way or another for 
3 this case up here, so I'll schedule it for Carbon 
4 County. I'll grant the motion for change of venue based 
5 on the stipulation. We'll have the case in--tried in 
6 Carbon County, unless you tell me we have an exhausted 
7 jury pool. 
8 THE CLERK: No, I have quite a big jury pool 
9 that we can access, Judge. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. And I think--I think that 
11 Carbon County owes Grand County one, because there was 
12 that case that was tried up here twice, first time a 
13 hung jury, second time couldn't get a jury. No, first 
14 time couldn't get a jury, second time barely got a jury, 
15 had to declare a mistrial halfway through and eventually 
16 tried it in Moab. 
17 So it would be fair. So we'll have it up here 
18 on--
19 MR. BENGE: So November 20th, 21st, 22nd, Your 
20 Honor? 
21 THE COURT: Yes. 
22 MR. BENGE: Same days? 
23 THE COURT: Same days. Now, what about the 
24 alibi? 
25 MR. BENGE: It's not an alibi. 
MR. SKORDAS: You mean the entrapment? 
THE COURT: Entrapment. 
MR. BENGE: Your Honor, what we would propose 
doing--first of all, I know Your Honor sat through the 
preliminary hearing. We would ask that the Court take 
consideration of the preliminary hearing videotape 
and/or transcript. I think--well, the tape is a 
transcript. 
We would also offer both the transcription of 
the audio recordings of the three different wired 
transactions at the time that this confidential 
informant went by the Penn/Drew house. 
The first time, there's really nothing in that 
one. But the second time when she went by it talked 
about the fact that her cousin or her brother-in-law was 
coming into town and she was going to try mushrooms for 
the first time, and during which time Mr. Penn asked if 
she could get some for him. And then the third tape and 
transcription is of the actual purchase. 
We would offer the three transcriptions and 
also the background tape recordings of the same thing. 
And with regard to the tape recordings, we have actually 
two tape recordings of each transcript--of each 
incident. As I understand them, one is a tape made from 
the KELL unit that is in the patrol vehicle. The other 
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1 is a tape made from the recording device that the CI had 
2 on her person, or the officer had on his person. Is 
3 that correct? 
4 (No audible response.) 
5 THE COURT: Do you have any objection to me 
6 receiving those in evidence, Mr. Skordas, for this 
7 purpose? 
8 MR. SKORDAS: Both the transcript and the tape? 
9 THE COURT: Yeah. 
10 MR. SKORDAS: No, I don't have any problem with 
11 that. We had some concerns about the--some of the 
12 transcript and had not reviewed the tape. Bill has 
13 provided those today, so certainly given that the Court 
14 may want to have both in hand at the same time when you 
15 review that information. 
16 THE COURT: Can they be listened to on a 
17 regular tape recorder? 
18 MR. BENGE: Yes, they--on a regular cassette. 
19 THE COURT: All right. I'll receive those. 
20 Let'a §*t them marked. 
21 THE CLERK: Should we (inaudible). 
22 MR. BENGE: I don't--I think if you could do it 
23 as just one (inaudible). Thank you. 
24 Offer Exhibits 1, 2 and 3, which are the 
25 transcripts, Your Honor. 
8 
1 Offer Exhibit 4, which are the audiotapes. And 
2 I received from the DEA Monday morning. 
3 THE COURT: Now, you have other--these are just 
4 copies, right? 
5 MR. BENGE: Yes. We have the ori--the DEA has 
6 maintained the originals. 
7 THE COURT: Now, I have a memorandum from 
8 Mr. Skordas. Do you have anything you want to add, 
9 Mr. Benge? 
10 MR. BENGE: Yes, Your Honor, just briefly. 
11 Your Honor, in response to this and perhaps to 
12 give Your Honor an idea of where the State is coming 
13 from in terms of what to listen for and read for, the 
14 law is pretty clear on entrapment, that merely providing 
15 a defendant an opportunity to commit a crime that he's 
16 already predisposed to commit is not entrapment. 
17 And we would point Your Honor to the second 
18 transcript, the longest one, where the confidential 
19 informant went and talked to Dr. Penn and Ms. Drew about 
20 the story about her relative coming to town and she was 
21 going to take mushrooms. 
22 First of all, in that tape there is reference 
23 to the fact that Dr. Penn has taken mushrooms before and 
24 talks about how he was on mushrooms in the clinic one 
25 day. Then he goes on to state later in that 
1 conversation, giving her detailed advice about how to 
2 take the mushrooms and how--that she'll probably be 
3 nauseated and not to worry about that. And that it's 
4 safe and the fact that he takes mushrooms rather than 
5 other drugs because they're not traceable by drug tests. 
6 And then in particular, toward the end of that 
7 tape, he goes into detail and says--she says, "Yeah, 
8 call me tomorrow and I'll tell you how it was." And 
9 Cindy says, "Check." And the CI says, "My cousin comes 
10 from Arizona, too, so I don't know." 
11 Dr. Penn says, "If he stocked any extra, we'll 
12 buy them." And the CI says, "I mean, you guys get yours 
13 locally, right?" Cindy Drew says, "From the northwest." 
14 Dr. Penn again says, uIf he's got any extra, I'll buy 
15 them from him." 
16 And, Your Honor, you listen to that--and that's 
17 the day before the transaction. Mr. Skordas did include 
18 the transcript from the day of the transaction, when the 
19 buy actually went down. It's part of his motion. We'd 
20 certainly ask that you look at that also. 
21 But here he is the day before, he's the one 
22 setting up the buy. Therefore, I think that just 
23 completely emasculates entrapment argument. We'd submit 
24 it. 
25 THE COURT: I'm obviously going to have to read 
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1 these and listen to the tapes. There's no point in 
2 taking them if I'm not. Do you have anything that you 
3 want to add? 
4 MR. SKORDAS: I do, Your Honor. And I'm not 
5 sure how we can accomplish this. 
6 I had filed a motion to sever because I felt 
7 that the co-defendant's testimony could be helpful in 
8 respect of this motion and, probably more importantly, 
9 the next motion. I spoke with her attorney about her 
10 ability to testify and she has — she's scheduled for a 
11 change of plea next week. Therefore, she's still 
12 shielded, I guess, for lack of a better word, by her 
13 Fifth Amendment privilege. 
14 I would like the opportunity to supplement the 
15 record with her testimony after she enters her plea next 
16 week, and would make myself available for a short 
17 evidentiary hearing in that respect to do that. But I 
18 believe that after she's entered her plea, I can call 
19 her as a witness in both of these motions, and I intend 
20 to do so. But I could not have done so today. 
21 THE COURT: Proffer what she would say. 
22 MR. SKORDAS: With respect to the entrapment 
23 issue, she could talk about the prior relationship with 
24 the confidential informant, the number of times that the 
25 two of them had been to the house, the nature of that 
11 
1 relationship. 
2 And I think with respect to entrapment, there 
3 is--that the nature of the relationship between the 
4 person who entrapped and the defendants, if you will, is 
5 important in determining whether or not they would do 
6 something that they would not have otherwise done. That 
7 is to say, if my--some close friend of mine begs me for 
8 something or asks me for something or persuades me to do 
9 something, I may be more willing to do that than I would 
10 for someone who is a co-worker or something like that. 
11 And so I think it's important to establish that 
12 relationship. 
13 THE COURT: You're an officer of the court. I 
14 trust that you won't tell me something that you clearly 
15 know you can't prove. You may--you may spin it some to 
16 what you hope that the witness would say. What do you 
17 hope the witness will say about the relationship? 
18 MR. SKORDAS: That she's more than just a co-
19 worker, that she's a friend. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. Someone--
21 MR. SKORDAS: She's a confidante, that she's 
22 someone who would visit their home that would befriend 
23 them, that would talk to them, that they would do things 
24 with, that was not just their office manager or 
25 bookkeeper or--
12 
1 THE COURT: More than a friend, even a close 
2 friend? 
3 MR. SKORDAS: Right. 
4 THE COURT: But not a sexual relationship, 
5 intimate in t;hat way? 
6 MR. SKORDAS: No. No. No. 
7 THE COURT: All right. 
8 MR. SKORDAS: That they had talked--
9 THE COURT: And would she say that there were 
10 any pleas, ''Please, you have to help me because I need--
11 I need you to do this for me, I need you to buy this''? 
12 MR. SKORDAS: I don't believe so. Although 
13 there's--I believe that there will be evidence that the 
14 confidential informant's husband has had some problems 
15 previously and that there was some dialogue between the 
16 two of them about him. And--
17 MR. BENGE: Evidence of what kind? 
18 MR. SKORDAS: Substance abuse, domestic 
19 violence, and that they--there was a greater level of 
20 confidence between the two of them because of that. 
21 THE COURT: All right. And that's what you 
22 might get from Ms. Drew? 
23 (No audible response.) 
24 THE COURT: That's the only additional evidence 
25 you'd want to present? 
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1 MR. SKORDAS: Yes. 
2 THE COURT: Well, all right. I guess what I'll 
3 have to do is listen to this, give a provisional ruling, 
4 or if I think I can give a ruling based on accepting 
5 your proffer as what her testimony would be, then I'll 
6 (inaudible) that as well. 
7 Are there any cases that either of you want me 
8 to read that are not already in the memoranda? 
9 MR. BENGE: No. 
10 THE COURT: All right. How about the motion to 
11 suppress, then? I guess you were planning to present 
12 that without any additional testimony as well. 
13 Mr. Skordas? 
14 MR. BENGE: I think the defense has that 
15 burden, inasmuch as there was a warrant (inaudible). 
16 THE COURT: Now, you have the--both the burden 
17 of going forward on that and--and the burden of--I guess 
18 there's a presumption of validity of the warrant. 
19 MR. SKORDAS: If there's a search warrant, 
20 that's true, and there was in this case. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. Do you have anything to add 
22 to your memorandum, Mr. Skordas, about the validity or 
23 invalidity of the search warrant? 
24 MR. SKORDAS: Not with respect to the 
25 anticipatory nature of the search warrant, which was 
14 
1 really the crux of our argument on that. 
2 Your Honor, again, this is something that I 
3 would ask leave of the Court to bring in the testimony 
4 of Cindy Drew on. And this would be a somewhat 
5 different issue than what was raised in our--our motion; 
6 that is, that the underlying facts that were relied on 
7 by the police officer were the result of an illegal 
8 search and seizure by the confidential informant who, at 
9 the time, was a confidential--was an agent of the 
10 police. 
11 I believe Cindy Drew would have--could testify 
12 that in order for this confidential informant to have 
13 seen what she saw, she would have gone into areas of the 
14 home that she was not entitled to go into as a guest or 
15 friend or whatever she was, the bathroom--the bathroom 
16 medicine chest. 
17 I think that the confidential informant 
18 testified that she had gone into these things prior to 
19 the time the search warrant was issued. She looked in 
20 the bathroom medicine chest and saw, about two weeks 
21 prior to the time the warrant was issued, some 
22 Hydrocodone or oxycodone, whatever it is, in a 
23 prescription bottle in the name of another person. And 
24 the police officers relied on that in obtaining their 
25 search warrant at the time when the confidential 
15 
1 informant was an agent of the police. 
2 I believe Ms. Drew will testify that she should 
3 not have been in the area of the house at that time and 
4 going through the medicine cabinet, and such that would 
5 have been an illegal search by someone who was at the 
6 time an agent of the police. 
7 THE COURT: I see. I wonder if you'll forgive 
8 me for coming back to the--
9 MR. SKORDAS: Entrapment? 
10 THE COURT: --entrapment question, because 
11 what--something Mr. Benge said raised a question in my 
12 mind that I'd like to resolve at this stage, if 
13 possible. 
14 Utah law says that the--the statutory law says 
15 that it's an objective test for entrapment, that it 
16 doesn't really matter what previous propensity the 
17 defendant had, that it's--that the police conduct is 
18 measured against a standard that really is--ought to be 
19 the same no matter who they're dealing with. And 
20 there's been a little--and when it comes to instructing 
21 the jury about what it is they're supposed to do, 
22 there's been a little back and forth on that in the 
23 decided opinions, and maybe some between the Court of 
24 Appeals and the Supreme Court. 
25 And then I think I also remember several years 
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1 ago the-U.S. Supreme Court in a child porn case said 
2 that the government had to prove a propensity--it was an 
3 unusual case where the defendant was saying you have to 
4 prove a propensity first. 
5 What I'm wondering, Mr. Skordas, is is it your 
6 view that the State does have to prove a propensity or 
7 is it your view in this case that the State does not--
8 can't prove--not only doesn't have to prove a propensity 
9 but cannot be permitted to do so? 
10 MR. SKORDAS: I'm trying to read the entrapment 
11 statute as you're speaking, and I'm not sure that I have 
12 a very knowledgeable answer for that. 
13 I guess I have never assumed that the State had 
14 to prove that the defendant had a propensity to commit 
15 the crime prior to the time they engaged him or her in 
16 their investigation. 
17 THE COURT: Well, that's what I understand Utah 
18 law is saying. There's this federal issue having over--
19 I don't want--in your case it probably hurt your client 
20 to have the State prove propensity. I don't know--I 
21 don't know what they would have. 
22 MR. SKORDAS: Right. 
23 THE COURT: Assuming they may get in more bad 
24 acts, if you say they have to prove propensity. But it 
25 certainly is required--in fact, it's not even written 
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1 under state law. But if federal law requires it, it 
2 probably trumps state law if you assert it. So I'm just 
3 giving you an opportunity to assert that the federal law 
4 does trump state law and you want the State to prove 
5 propensity. Maybe you want to take some time for you to 
6 think about that. 
7 MR. SKORDAS: Thank you. 
8 THE COURT: Take some time before you tell me. 
9 Unless you tell me that, I'm just going to go under 
10 state law. 
11 MR. SKORDAS: I understand. 
12 MR. BENGE: I guess my response, Your Honor, is 
13 I feel that if either--in either case, for the purpose 
14 of this hearing, that the transcripts speak for 
15 themselves and would show the lack of entrapment, either 
16 under state or federal standard, if that is the current 
17 federal standard. 
18 THE COURT: All right. Back to the motion to 
19 suppress. I think I've got--I think I have now picked 
20 up on what Mr. Skordas is saying, that the State had a 
21 confidential informant who was working for the State as 
22 an agent at the time some two weeks before the buy when 
23 she was in the house, she would have been snooping 
24 around in places she did not have permission to be. 
25 MR. BENGE: Well, Your Honor, she did see the 
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1 one drug in the medicine cabinet. The other drug, I 
2 believe, was in the refrigerator. I guess I would throw 
3 back the fact that as counsel contends that they were 
4 such good friends, perhaps she had a right to be 
5 everywhere in that house. 
6 Other than that, Your Honor, I believe that 
7 this is a pretty strong burden to overthrow a valid 
8 search warrant issued by a sitting judge. And I think 
9 absent some indication that this is perjured testimony, 
10 the anticipatory nature is what Mr. Skordas went into in 
11 his motion. And I believe that it, number one, was 
12 truth. And Investigator Johnson is here, if Mr. Skordas 
13 would like to cross-examine him on the perjury aspect of 
14 it. And the anticipatory information came true. We'd 
15 submit it. 
16 THE COURT: Let me just ask you about--about 
17 the medicine cabinet and refrigerator. So it's your 
18 position that as good a friend as that, they let her 
19 into their home, and they have no reasonable expectation 
20 that she's not going to open the refrigerator, she's not 
21 going to open the medicine cabinet? Is that the idea? 
22 MR. BENGE: Yes, Your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: There's not a reasonable 
24 expectation of privacy with someone that you're that 
25 good a friend with and you invite into your home? 
19 
1 MR. BENGE: That would be our position. 
2 THE COURT: You're not going to be saying that 
3 she would never have permission to go to the--into a 
4 rest room--into the restroom in this home? 
5 MR. SKORDAS: I would say that Cindy Drew, the 
6 co-defendant, will testify that at the time Lisa LePlant 
7 went into the home and searched the medicine cabinet and 
8 the refrigerator, she was not an invitee of the home and 
9 that both of the co-defendants were not present in the 
10 home. She would testify that they were not there, nor 
11 was she given permission to enter the home. 
12 I believe that her testimony would be--
13 THE COURT: So even though you may let your 
14 neighbor--your friend come to your house then you may 
15 say--they go into your rest room or may go in your 
16 refrigerator, that doesn't mean they can come in when 
17 you're not there and do that? 
18 MR. SKORDAS: Right. I believe that her 
19 testimony would be, Your Honor, if I could make a 
20 proffer again--you've been very generous in that respect 
21 --that Nat and Cindy were out of town, that they had 
22 asked her to feed their cat during that time through a 
23 door that didn't require her to come into the house, and 
24 that she nonetheless entered the house and looked in the 
25 refrigerator and looked into the medicine cabinet. 
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1 THE COURT: Do you have some proffer on that, 
2 Mr. Benge? 
3 MR. BENGE: Yes, Your Honor. First of all, I 
4 was reminded in talking to Mr. Johnson, who is the 
5 affiant of the--on the search warrant, that the 
6 confidential informant had seen the prescription bottle 
7 and the Demerol in their house prior to the point that 
8 she became an agent for the DEA. 
9 She later--after she became an agent for the 
10 DEA, she saw the same items again. Secondly, I would 
11 point out, Your Honor--
12 THE COURT: Did she do it on an occasion when 
13 she was feeding one of their animals or (inaudible). 
14 MR. BENGE: I can't remember. 
15 Secondly, I would point out that in the 
16 probable cause statement it just says that she saw the 
17 prescription bottle in the bathroom. She didn't say the 
18 medicine cabinet. I cannot recall if she was more 
19 specific than that when she made the search warrant. 
20 But I think the search warrant speaks for itself on 
21 that. It just says uin the bathroom." She certainly--
22 if she was in there feeding her cat, she would have had 
23 the use of the bathroom. If she's there visiting, she 
24 would have the use of the bathroom. 
25 THE COURT: Well, it sounds to me like we 
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actually have some factual issues about what happened 
here. But you don't have the informant here to testify? 
MR. BENGE: I didn't bring her. I didn't 
realize that that was going to be an issue today. 
THE COURT: It isn't necessarily signaled by 
the memorandum. 
MR. BENGE: But I could--if you wish to take 
her testimony, I could certainly get her--make her 
available. 
MR. SKORDAS: Are you looking at the affidavit, 
Your Honor? The affidavit simply states "approximately 
two weeks ago"--and the affidavit is dated the 19th, so 
I'm assuming that would have been on about the 4th or 
5th of April 2002--"the CI was in the residence 
described as Third East and Third South and saw some 
multi-dose vials of Demerol in their refrigerator. She 
also saw some Oxycodone in a prescription bottle labeled 
with the name of Robert Silver in the bathroom." That 
was the time period that we--
THE COURT: Well, so you would--what you're 
asking me on this--on this ground at least here, the 
ground of the reasonable expectation of privacy was 
violated on that two-week ago period, what you would 
like me to do is strike that paragraph from the 
affidavit and then evaluate the affidavit as to whether 
22 
it has probable cause? Is that right? 
MR. SKORDAS: Well--I don't know. 
THE COURT: Yeah, I don't--I'm not, you know--
MR. SKORDAS: You catch me off guard. 
THE COURT: --entitled to throw the whole thing 
out just because there's part of it that's inadmissible, 
am I? 
MR. SKORDAS: No. No. I guess you could look 
at the search warrant and strike language that's 
problematic. We still haven't dealt with the 
anticipatory nature of the search warrant. 
THE COURT: Well, let's deal with that then. 
Because I think even if we strike that paragraph about 
what happened two weeks earlier, that we still have 
ample probable cause here for the issuance of the 
warrant, unless something about the anticipatory nature 
of it rings a bell with me. So tell me why the 
anticipatory nature makes it invalid. 
MR. SKORDAS: I guess I would just refer the 
Court--you apparently have reviewed my memorandum. 
Anticipatory search warrants, by their nature, take the 
probable cause determination away from a judge and place 
it in the hands of law enforcement. 
And I suppose Bill could argue correctly that 
the anticipatory event actually occurred, and so the 
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officers are then justified in making the final 
determination, which I believe the Fourth Amendment 
requires you to make in deciding whether or not they 
could go into the house and execute the search warrant. 
It would have been very easy, Your Honor, and 
it would not have delayed this matter, had the police 
officers waited until that event and then approached the 
Court and gone into the house and got the search warrant 
and said, She's gone in the house, we searched her 
before and after. She had mushrooms before, she doesn't 
have them now. She was wired, whatever, and so we 
believe there's going to be mushrooms in the house. 
But instead, they say, Trust us, Judge, and 
we're going to send her in there and when she comes out 
she probably won't have mushrooms and therefore you 
ought to give us the green light to go ahead and search, 
but we'll make that determination ultimately. And what 
we'd like to do--
THE COURT: The test does impose the condition 
on the validity of the warrant that--
MR. SKORDAS: Right. 
THE COURT: --those things have to actually 
occur, 
MR. SKORDAS: Right, in the mind of the police 
officers. But the Fourth Amendment requires the officer 
24 
1 to swear that they did occur and, in my opinion, Your 
2 Honor, when you issued that search warrant, not cross 
3 our hearts we think they'll occur, and if they do, can 
4 we go ahead and do this. 
5 THE COURT: Is there case law on this? 
6 MR. SKORDAS: Only what I've cited that we 
7 could find, Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: I mean, is there case law that says 
9 absolutely no anticipatory warrants in Utah? 
10 MR. SKORDAS: No, Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: Is there a case that says, yes, 
12 sometimes anticipatory warrants are okay in Utah, or has 
13 it not been addressed yet? 
14 MR. SKORDAS: I believe that the case--that the 
15 nature of that has not been addressed very well for us, 
16 Your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Mr. Benge, are there cases in Utah 
18 whether an anticipatory search--apparently the statute 
19 contemplates it. 
20 MR. BENGE: Yes, Your Honor. I'm not aware of 
21 the case law. The statute does contemplate it, and I 
22 think that that's the safeguard, is that the warrant 
23 says--I mean, if this deal didn't go down and the sale 
24 of the mushrooms didn't occur, then our search warrant 
25 wouldn't have been valid. 
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1 THE COURT: And you're just trusting the 
2 officers. Are there cases from other jurisdictions? 
3 MR. BENGE: I (inaudible). 
4 THE COURT: Mr. Skordas, are there cases from 
5 other jurisdictions that say absolutely no anticipatory 
6 warrants here? 
7 MR. SKORDAS: No, I don't believe so. 
8 THE COURT: Are there cases in other 
9 jurisdictions that you know of that say, Yeah, 
10 anticipatory warrants are okay? Or have you not really 
11 looked at the question? 
12 MR. SKORDAS: I haven't, but I would be happy 
13 to do so in short order. 
14 THE COURT: Well, Ifm--I kind of need to make a 
15 decision now. I suppose I can always change it between 
16 now and the trial and, theoretically, some opportunity 
17 to change after trial. 
18 MR. SKORDAS: I think we could do all that 
19 without bumping the trial or moving it. We could even 
20 have a ahort evidentiary hearing the morning of trial 
21 and h&vji the jury come at noon or whatever. Ifm trying 
22 to make it easy on everybody. 
23 THE COURT: Well, at this point I don't--I have 
24 not been convinced that the anticipatory nature of the 
25 warrant renders it invalid. It seems like a reasonable 
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THF m i TFT: We lusL nad a c a s e , I t h i n k in 
Utah, on telephonic warrants where somebody screwed up 
trying to do that. And it is so easy to screw up on a 
telephonic warrant that I--I shiver at the thought that 
someone would call me up and want to do a telephonic 
warrant, because--
MR. BENGE: I've tried to avoid it. 
THE COURT: --it's a logistical nightmare. And 
the only careful way, and I think the sane way to do 
telephonic warrants, is simply to do them the same as 
regular warrants and just read the affidavit over the 
telephone. But today, you might as well fax it, which 
is what we have done in some cases. 
The risk from having a telephonic conversation 
between a judge and an affidavit where additional 
information may be provided is not reflected in the 
affidavit, it's just that we're not recorded, it's just 
too gray. And so I think not only is anticipatory 
permissible under these circumstances, it really ought 
to be preferred. 
I won't have the last say on that, but for what 
it's worth, from my practical experience with warrants, 
the police ought to be encouraged to do it under these 
circumstances. It creates — it eliminates the--the 
concerns that arise with the passage of time between 
when events are observed and when the warrant can be 
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25 I:,he b a U u u MM I tuiin I <i Mi - i^ f i iiprator, because luey 
were directed immediately to the mushrooms, which were 
really, at that point, the only focus of the warrant 
that's left. 
THE COURT: You want an opportunity to argue 
that point or to present evidence on it? 
MR. SKORDAS: I guess I just argued it, but to 
present evidence on--I didn't argue it very well, but I 
would like to present evidence on that as well, and then 
that would strike part of the warrant. 
THE COURT: I think the warrant would--once 
there's probable cause to believe that there is some in 
the house, I think they're entitled to look everywhere 
in the house. I think that's pretty well established. 
So having considered that argument, and even if 
I--if you had the opportunity to present that evidence, 
it would not change my ruling with respect to the 
evidence that was eventually seized. 
I think you probably don't entertain much doubt 
about how I'm going to rule on the motion to dismiss on 
the entrapment grounds. But I think I have an 
obligation to read these things and listen to the tapes. 
And so I will--I will do that before ruling on the 
ent rapment i s sue. 
On the entrapment question, the way I--the way 
I understand that--and, Mr. Skordas, you can tell me if 
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MI! f hiniK I'm wi'nii'i about t h i s - - h ^ - e * ^ - --^ —•=> -—\ l a i s e 
"lie q u e s t i o n t h e dial1? has • . . _ . / 
beyond :n r e a s o n a b l e doubl". , A::.: . .nderscan: : - - '. ~ '. c 
>Lnip 1 y l ie odiiie i " I Ivv' " i i *^  
i s e , which has t o be proven ;^ „:.*- . : : a ; e L~ •;,; 
i easnnab I I hi I have U i e - e r m i n e whe the r :f -
e v i d e n c e i s l iea id , i r e a s o n a ^ x . , _.ry cou,_. : t ^ : . . 
l e a s o n a h l e doubt" rliai' 1 h^ e lement nas ceen e s t a b l i s h e d 
r \' 11 HI i. he de t e n s e lias IJHHIJ ii*-1 J *! ijd 1 Hn i v-lin . M 
u n d e r s t a n d my r o l e t o be- -
11 ^yriQp^o • .i .
 # 
THE COURT, wi'lh r e s p e c t t o en t rapment . -
II n i (1 *=M ' n "I w K | w lie t he r - - wha t t h e ] u r y s hou 1 d do, - u s t 
de c ldi r l u whe t h e r a r e a s o n a b 1 e i u r } r ::: : u 1 d • io ai I y ti ii i lg 
except - - w h e t h e r a r e a s o n a b l e j u r y cou ld c o n v i c t , 
i j a s i c a l I
 i I. ij ji ".. i'i(i i j 1", . 
And a c t u a l l y , most if r.he c a s e s t h a t go up t : 
i ii.ji 4j^(( | | ,i > i 'ill in »"if- > p^qri.apit -ij-o hhe ^arrp 
n t u a t i o n s a s w e l l , so l liey p i e tLy muL.fi j u s t d e f i n e t h e 
\11*er boundary o t wha L - -e
 ven i f t:.a. j ~r} * : v e - _ - , t he 
i udges won't permit' ii-
I'rf t h e r e a n y t h i n g e l s e we need t o a d d r e s s h e r e 1 
I M i I II! IH I II I l I i J I H S p L i] L b t . 1 ) 
i f 11> CO 1.IR T ; b" o y ou wa n t t: o s c h e d u l - ~ <- i ~ e f ~ -"-
1
 I"" »jnl; rapmeui heat »n>'") U n 1 v, •* need, Oi ao y^u. wu^. 
3 ! 
1 to just go ahead and have the trial and make a record 
2 during the trial or as an aside during the trial, 
3 without the jury there, on these things? My calendar is 
4 pretty full between now and November 2 0th. 
5 MR. BENGE: Mine is too. I have--I was just 
6 looking because I know I have prelims in Moab, but 
7 they're on the 26th so that doesn't help us at all. I 
8 guess we could just do it the morning of the trial. 
9 THE COURT: Well, okay. Let's not schedule any 
10 other hearings, but I'll give you a chance to make a 
11 record on these statements without it counting against 
12 you that it's actually after the trial's started. 
13 And I'll try to get a ruling out to you by the 
14 end of this week or the first of next week on the 
15 entrapment question, 
16 MR. BENGE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: We'll be in recess. 
18 I (The hearing was concluded.) 
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Addendum II 
JAMES C. BR ADSHAW (#3768) 
BROWN, BRADSIIAW & MOFFAT, I I P. 
10 West Broadway, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-5297 
Facsimile: (801) 532-5298 
Attorneys for Defendant 
i I I I i »i M i l HI 'hi ! 1 -ill i us I K n 11 n i in, ,Ki at in i1 MI mi , I I ' in 
IN \ N P FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Pm mi i IT, 
v. 
NATHA 1 1EI PR EDERI< :K PE ! J I 
Defendant. 
I 11 IN I"i IH V'V> I PI U-
. *3 
The defendant, I ' J art write! Penn, by and thi ough his uttoi ncy < f • ccord, hei cby move* this 
Coan, pursuant to U.R Cr.P Rule 24. for an oi der granting a new" trial in this .matter, Sentencing 
was held on Janua™- il)03 and this motion Is tin icly filed uncila: U R.Ci IE , Rule 24^c), . 
Said motion is made or. the grounds that the interests of justice require a, new trial The 
grounds for the grant of a new trial, include, but are not limited to: erroneous jury instructions 
that prejudiced the outcome of the trial and directed the jury to find juilt upon something other 
than • easonable doubt; and the facial invalidity ' of the anticipatory search wauaui aul hoi ized i n 
this case 
Del endant additionally asserts that at the tin tc of the fillliiii ig ;:  1: this i i ration, counsel has 
requested but not yet received transcripts necessary to this motion. ( "ounsc! herein did not 
represent the defendant at trial, has recently been i etained. ai id therefore needs time to obtain 
and review the trial transcript and other i.ecc^my iiilurrndiion to present in support of tins 
motion. As such, Defendant reserves the right to amend and/or supplement the grounds 
justifying a new trial upon receipt and review of the necessary information. 
Finally, the Defendant requests a hearing in this matter at which time he can present 
testimony and evidence to support this motion. 
1 IMV 
DATED this L\ day of January 2003. 
/AMES C. BRADSHAW 
/Attorney for Defendant 
T hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion tor iNew Trial was 
mailed, postage prepaid, to Happy Morgan, Grand County Attorney, 125 F. Center St., Moab, 
Utah, 84532, on the Z \ ^ day of January 2003. 
AVfG\K5S8 
< iflAUftl&A. ^MAAO/f. 
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\M!-SC BRADSHAW(#3768) 
V.tr^iey for Defendant 
BROWN, BRADSHAW & MOFFAI . 
10 West Broadway, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-5297 
Facsimile: (801)532-5298 ' 
< ' - \ ' p -• - " 'v . DISTRICT COURT 
\ WDVOR (iRAM)i'Oi \ IT. ST \TE OF UTAH 
STXTEOFl'TAH, 
iviw i IWIN i OR NEW TRIAL 
v
-
NATHANIEL FREDERICK PENN, . Case V. ._. . ;Z43 
(Judge t \ •* '•>i ;-irson) 
Defendant. 
Defendant, through counsel, hereby submits this memorandum in support ^ h - , n\owc-, 
for new trial. 
INTRODUCTION 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(a) states, 
1 he court may, upon motion of a party ^ * *p 
initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of JL^ _. 
is any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse 
effect upon the rights of a party. 
I t R Cum F. JJu). . ' • • : 
Herein, the defendant alleges that there were errors or impropneties in the trial r this 
matter that had a substantial adverse effect upon his nghts. The first prejudicial error centered 
a oi a 
controlled substance. These instructions erroneously instructed the jury that it was proper to fu id 
a simple finding that there may have been improper record keeping Further, and just as 
importantly, there was no instruction that such a finding of "improper record keeping" had to be 
made beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Second error that prejudiced Mr Penn's right to a fair trial in this matter centers 
around the anticipatory warrant that was authorized in this case The Warrant was not supported 
by probable cause, nor was the warrant validly executed, and as such, the motion to suppress 
filed in this case should have been granted, and all evidence seized as a result of the warrant 
should have been suppressed. 
These errors, whether examined individually or cumulatively, prejudiced the defendant 
and the sole remedy is the granting of a new trial. 
Additionally, at the filing of this motion and memorandum, the Defendant has yet to 
receive the requested transcripts and other supporting documents necessary for full review As 
such, the Defendant reserves the right to supplement and/or amend his claims in support of this 
motion for new trial 
RELEVANT FACTS 
General Background Information 
1. On April 29, 2002, the Defendant was charged by Information with three Second 
Degree Felony counts of Unlawful Possession of A Controlled Substance in A Drug Free Zone, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8. Count I charged the illegal possession of psilocybin, 
Count II charged the illegal possession of hydrocodone, and Count II charged the illegal 
possession of demerol. 
2. Prior to trial, the defendant, through his trial counsel, Greg Skordas, filed a 
Motion to Suppress In his supporting memorandum, the defendant argued 1) that at the time the 
2 
warrant was sought, and based on the allegations of the CI, there was no probable cause that the 
Defendant had engaged in any wrongdoing or that there was evidence of any crime at the 
residence; an i 2) till: lat 1:1: ie anti- :ipatory search warrant was invalid because the " i n g u e r ^ g events 
did not guarantee that the contraband described in the search warrant affidavit wouia r^ it the 
De feudal ill llnniii M I f1 lb mm iiiiiliiiiiii in iii|i|inil nl mnlimi In Suppress .il ' -I i m-
concerning allegations that the triggering events did not occur, that the no-knock and night time 
execution was improper, ot t:l ie absei ice of i: eliability ai id ;ei acitj ' it lfoi i: i latioi 1 :::>( 1:1: ie CI ii 11! i * 
affidavit in support of the warrant: were not mentioned in the written, memorandum, and 
seemingly did not serve as bases for the motion to suppress.1 
J. In dealing w ith the motion to suppress, the Court did not consider 'he i - u e s 
concerning the CI, but instead found, without hearing testimony or argument, tl: lat the remainder 
o • ^ v r ^ r was sufficient.2 As such, the Court denied 
the :etenUant s M- ' .o ' t to ^up:-rcvN 
4. 
found Mr. Penn guilty of all three counts. 
. 5. 
granted the defendant the privilege of probation for a term ot ; o months, including sentencing 
the defendant to serve 1 .v,- ua>„ .., ::,e u r a n a ^ . ~ . 
6. Pursuam • K ... _ 4 4 4 i . I Jefendant herein moves this court to order a 
new trial 'based on prejudicial errorc m-1%,; j u ; i i , b :;;^  '».«. - ,.;.; case. 
Such m i 
a*Mj - "he r^i'" 
•
 2Facts concerning the Cour t ' s ruling will be more fully detailed in supplemental 
memorandum once the defendant has received and reviewed the transcripts. 
i inc i t ed - stance of counsel, ai id Defendai it 
3 
Facts Relevant to the Jury Instructions Given at Trial 
7. At Trial, the Court gave the following Instructions with regard to the possession 
elements: 
a. Instruction No, 3 states the following: 
In order to obtain a conviction, the state must prove each element 
of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Those elements are as 
follows: 
COUNT I: POSSESSION OF PSILOCIN IN A DRUG FREE 
ZONE 
1. That on or about April 20, 2002, 
2. Defendant possessed psilocin, 
3. In a drug free zone, and 
4. Knowing what it was and intending to possess it. 
COUNT II: ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF HYDROCODONE 
IN A DRUG FREE ZONE 
1. That on or about April 20, 2002, 
2. Defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed 
hydrocodone, 
3. In a drug free zone, and 
4. Without a prescription or otherwise complying with 
the law. 
COUNT III: ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DEMEROL IN A 
DRUG FREE ZONE 
i. That on or about April 20, 2002, 
2. Defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed 
Demerol, 
3. In a drug free zone, and 
4. Without a prescription or otherwise complying with 
the law. 
b. Instruction No. 6 states the following: 
Physicians licensed to prescribe controlled substances must still 
obtain a prescription for any controlled substance for personal use. 
Physicians licensed to dispense or administer controlled substances 
are also permitted to possess reasonable quantities of controlled 
substances for dispensing or administering to patients, but they are 
required to keep a record of controlled substances received for that 
purpose and dispensed or administered by them as physicians. A 
4 
physician who fails to comply with this requirement possesses those 
substances illegally j 
I aii its Rele rai it il: o tl le "' i itl :ip at :: 1: 3 ' Seai ell 1 ' * 'ai i: ai it 
8. On April 19, 2002, Investigator Rob Johnson (" Johnson") 'from the DEA sought 
and received an anticipatory search warrant to search tl le residence located at 300 East 300 
south, in Moab, Utah.4 
0
 In support of the warrant, Johnson ^ujin.v^vi a sworn afiivjav \i ,w . , - a ne 
issi les presented herein, P a r a g r a p h 3 of the section entitled "Probable Cause and information1,1 
describes a small portion of a wired conversation between a CI, Mr. Penn, and Ms. Cindy Drew 
"agrapli id 1 Hi 11!11 nihil Inllins ini> illn» iliuns: 
On April 19, 2002, CI was wired by agents and CI went to the 
above described residence. CI asked Penn and Drew about the side 
effects of using mushrooms. CI said C F s brother had some 
mushrooms that CI was considering trying. Penn and Drew gave 
CI their opinion of how safe mushrooms were and said it was 
good. They described how mushrooms would make CI feel wrhich 
based on their past experience of using mushrooms. Penn then 
^
 r I if he stocked any extra we 11 buy it. Drew then said they 
* from the northwest. Penn then said again, if he's got any 
extra, 17/ buy some from him. Penn then said, enough for two of 
us, Drew then said, Well, I'll buy some for Dave too, cuz I ow e 
Da 'e a favor and, he wanted some. 
Dr. Nathaniel Penn and Cindy Drew live together in the above 
described residence and said residence is v\ ithin a drug free zone. 
1 -d -tateb. 
On Apni JU. 1W1. Detween ^ H and noon, m- A agent* will meet 
3 Ai this point, counsel herein has not yet received the requested trial t ranscr ipt \ s su^n, 
it is i\ this time unknown whether trial counsel objected to Instruction \ o 6 and r proposed A 
diffe m i n s t r u c t .» V ^^cr r hne ma* ^e a ^ ^ i d ^ '«•: r e f t e ^ i i ^ assistance claims • *!vs 
point 
4
 A copy of the "Affidav it" in support, of the anticipatory warrant is attached as "Exhibi t 
A " \ copy of the "Search Warrant" is attached as "Exhibi t B '' 
5 
with CI CI and an undercover agent (UC) will be searched and CI 
will be wired. CI or UC will be given some psilocybm mushroom. 
CFs vehicle will also be searched CI and an undercover agent will 
drive in CI's vehicle to the above described residence of Penn and 
Drew with the mushrooms Agents will have CI and UC under 
visual and audio observation at all times driving to and from said 
residence, they will have CI and UC under audio observation while 
they are in the residence. It is anticipated that CI and UC will offer 
Penn and/or Drew the mushrooms for sale for either cash and/or 
controlled substance prescriptions. After CI and UC leave the 
residence, CI and UC and CFs vehicle will be researched. 
11. Based on the information in the affidavit, officers obtained a warrant 
12. The warrant allowed an unannounced search of the residence any time day or 
night, to search for "controlled substances, including, but not limited to, psilocybm mushrooms 
and/or controlled substances." 
13. Finally, the Warrant stated that: 
This search warrant is valid only upon the occurrence of the events 
described in the affidavit for this anticipatory search warrant. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS WERE PLAINLY ERRONEOUS, DENIED 
THE DEFENDANT HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL, AND REQUIRE THE 
GRANTING OF A NEW TRIAL IN THIS MATTER. 
Because the Instructions to the jury were erroneous, misstated the law, and effectively 
allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty of the "unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance" upon something other than reasonable doubt, the Defendant's due process rights were 
violated and a new trial is warranted. See e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
As noted above, the Defendant was found guilty of three counts of "unlawful possession 
of a controlled substance," in violation of Utah Code Ann § 58-37-8. The specific provision 
under which the defendant was charged states that it is unlawful: 
6 
For any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or 
order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter... 
Utah Code. Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (emphasis added). 
A physician, however, is one of those specifically authorized pursuant to Chapter 37, to 
possess controlled substances. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-6(2)(b). 
The Court, in Instruction No. 3, instructed the jury that an individual is guilty of the 
specific crime of "unlawful possession" when the individual possesses a controlled substance 
"without a prescription or otherwise complying with the law." Instruction No. 3 also explained 
to the jury that such element had to be found "beyond a reasonable doubt." However, there was 
no instruction clarifying what "otherwise complying with the law means." Without 
definition, such a phrase could be used by a jury to find guilt of "unlawful possession" based 
upon a violation of any provision, no matter how minor. Such instruction, therefore, 
misinstructs the jury since a violation of Chapter 37 is not necessarily the felonious crime of 
"unlawful possession." 
Further, the closest clarification as to what "otherwise complying with the law" means 
was found in Instruction No. 6. Therein, the Court instructed the jury that physicians are 
required to keep a record of controlled substances received for the purpose of administering as a 
physician, and that a "physician who fails to comply with this requirement possesses those 
substances illegally "(emphasis and italics added). Here, the Court erroneously equated a failure 
to keep adequate records to the felony offense of "unlawful possession,"effectively creating a 
new crime. 
Overall, Instruction No. 6 fails in the following particulars: 1) The instruction misstates 
the elements of "unlawful possession" of a controlled substance as contemplated by § 58-37-
7 
8(2)(a)(i); 2) The instruction gives no guidance as to what the required elements of the Court's 
newly created "record keeping offense" are; and 3) the instruction effectively allowed the jury to 
find guilt under something other than the requisite reasonable doubt standard. 
First, as noted previously, Instruction No. 6 equates improper record keeping with the 
criminal statutory crime of "unlawful possession of a controlled substance." This is simply not 
true. While the failure to keep appropriate records may be improper, unethical, unprofessional, 
and while such failure could amount to possible civil and administrative liability, a failure to 
"knowingly" keep proper records alone is, at most, a class B misdemeanor. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(5) (providing that any violation of Chapter 37 for which no penalty has been 
delineated, is a Class B misdemeanor). However, the Court's instructions improperly converted a 
misdemeanor violation into a second degree felony. Such a result is contrary to the clearly 
expressed intent of the legislature. To hold as such would mean that any time a clerical error is 
made, a doctor may be found guilty of the felony. Simply put, a doctor does not become a 
felon simply because he does not keep proper records. 
Second, the jury was given no guidance as to what the record-keeping requirements were. 
Although the jury was clearly told that a physician who does not keep records properly is 
possessing drugs illegally, the jury was given absolutely no guidance as to what records were 
required and under what circumstances the law was violated. 
Third, the jury was also never instructed as to the mental state required relative to the 
record keeping violation. In other words, the jury was never guided as to whether the Defendant 
had to be the one who had failed in the record keeping duties, or whether he was also criminally 
responsible for a dereliction in record keeping duties on the part of his staff. 
Finally and perhaps most importantly, the jury was never told that the failure to keep 
8 
the appropriate records, which had effectively become an element of the offense, had to be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In doing so, the prosecution was improperly relieved of it 
burden to prove every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt See e g, State v 
Hererra, 895 P 2d 359, 368 (Utah 1995) ("For defendants to be convicted, due process mandates 
that the prosecution prove every element of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt),Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-1-501(1) (defendant in criminal proceeding presumed to be innocent until 
each element of the offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and in absence of such proot, 
the defendant shall be acquitted). 
In sum, this Court improperly instructed the jury that failure to keep proper records 
automatically amounted to "illegal possession " The instructions were plainly erroneous, denied 
the defendant his right to a fair trial, and require the granting of a new trial in this matter 
II. THE ANTICIPATORY WARRANT ISSUED IN THIS CASE 
WAS INVALID, 
A. The General Requirements of All Anticipatory Warrants 
In this case, investigators sought and received an "anticipatory" search warrant. 
"Anticipatory search warrants are peculiar to property in transit." State v Womack, 967 P 2d 
536, 539 (Utah 1998) (citing United States v Leidner, 99 F.3d 1423, 1425 (7th Cir. 1996), cert 
denied, 520 U.S. 1169 (1997)). These types of search warrants are "based upon an affidavit 
showing probable cause that at some future time (but not presently) certain evidence of crime 
will be located at a specified place." Womack, 967 P 2d at 539 (citing 2 Wayne H. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure §§ 3.7(c), at 362 (3d ed. 1996)). 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that anticipatory search warrants are not per se 
9 
unconstitutional under the federal constitution.5 Womack, 967 P.2d at 539-40. However, two 
general requirements for a valid anticipatory warrant must be met: "(I) that it be supported by 
probable cause; and (2) that the warrant or supporting affidavit clearly set out conditions 
precedent to the warrant's execution." Id. at 543 (citing United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 
1194, 1201 (10th Cir. 1998)). 
J* Probable Cause 
"In examining the validity of an anticipatory warrant, the probable cause analysis differs 
most from the analysis of a traditional search warrant." See Validity of Anticipatory Search 
Warrants-State Cases, 67 A.L.R.5th 361, § 2b (2002). "Anticipatory warrants differ from 
traditional search warrants in that at the time of issuance they are not supported by probable 
cause to believe that contraband is currently located at the place to be searched." Womack 967 
P.2d at 543 (citing Rowland, 145 F.3d at 1201). "As with other search warrants, however, 
anticipatory warrants must be supported by probable cause." Id. As such, "[b]efore issuing an 
anticipatory warrant the magistrate must determine, based on the information presented in 
the warrant application, that there is probable cause to believe the items to be seized will 
be at the designated place when the search is to take place." Id. (emphasis added). See also, 
Validity of Anticipatory Search Warrants-State Cases, 67 A.L.R.5th 361, § 2b ("A prosecutor 
must be able to demonstrate that when a warrant is issued there exists concrete and reliable 
evidence in a supporting affidavit that a crime will be committed in the near future or that an 
item will be at a specific location in the near future"). 
5The Utah Supreme Court did not reach the issue as to whether anticipatory warrants are 
unconstitutional under the Utah Constitution. 
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1 Conditions Precedent or "Triggering Events" 
As noted above, "[p]robable cause to support anticipatory warrants is conditioned on the 
occurrence of certain expected or triggering events, typically the future delivery, sale, or 
purchase of contraband." Womack, 967 P.2d. at 543 (internal quotations omitted). "In 
determining whether probable cause exists, the magistrate therefore must take into account the 
likelihood that the triggering events will occur on schedule and as predicted/' Id. (internal 
citations and quotations omitted). 
Further, "because the probable cause underlying an anticipatory warrant depends on 
whether certain events occur, the warrant or affidavit must state conditions allowing the search 
to be done only after those expected events occur/' Womack, 967 P.2d at 543-44 (citing 
Rowland, 145 F.3d at 1201). "This not only ensures against premature execution of the warrant, 
but also maintains judicial control over the probable cause determination and over the 
circumstances of the warrant's execution." Id. at 544. "Consistent with these goals, the 
conditions controlling the warrant's execution should be explicit, clear, and narrowly drawn so 
as to avoid misunderstanding or manipulation by government agents." Id. (internal citations and 
quotations omitted)(emphasis added). Importantly, an "anticipatory warrant is invalid if the 
'triggering event' does not arise." Id. 
"Along with assessing the probability that certain triggering events will happen, the 
magistrate must also evaluate the probability that, following the triggering events, the 
evidence will be in the named place when the search warrant is executed." Womack, 967 
P.2d at 543 (emphasis added). "As with any warrant, probable cause for an anticipatory warrant 
does not exist unless a sufficient nexus between the contraband and the place to be searched 
exists.'" Id. (internal quotations and brackets omitted). 
11 
"In short, the magistrate must not abandon the juristic role of assessing probable cause 
by depending on police guarantees that the search will not be done unless there is probable 
cause/' Id. "The magistrate must instead demand that police specifically show, on the facts 
existing when the magistrate issues the warrant, that the evidence to be confiscated will be 
at the named place when the search occurs." Id. (emphasis added). 
B. The Anticipatory Warrant Was Invalid Because The Conditions 
Precedent Did Not Give Rise To Probable Cause That A Crime 
Was Being or Would Be Committed. 
L No Probable Cause In General 
The conditions set forth in the affidavit did not give rise to probable cause that any 
crime would be committed or that any illegal controlled substance would be found at the 
location.6 
Anticipatory warrants must be supported by probable cause, and the magistrate must 
determine, based on information presented in the warrant application, that there is probable 
cause to believe the items seized will be at the designated place when the search is to take place. 
''Utah's definition of probable cause is that there is a 'fair probability that evidence of the crime 
will be found in the place or places named in the warrant."1 Womack at 541. 
In this case the anticipated information shows only that the agent or the CI would offer 
the mushrooms to the defendant. However, there is no condition precedent that established 
the likelihood that the defendant would acquire possession of the drugs. Indeed, what was 
presented to thf magistrate by affidavit in this case could be used to justify a search of any 
residence so ioqgat there is an allegation that the government is going to take the drugs there 
and offer them to the resident. It is important to remember that the warrant is judged by the 
6The defendant reserves the right to amend and/or supplement his grounds for a new trial 
to include the possible improper execution of the anticipatory warrant, upon receipt and review 
of the transcript in this case. 
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content contained within the four corners of the document and not on the actual events which 
occurred at the time of execution. Cf State v Potter, 860 P 2d 952, 955-56 and n 4 (Utah App 
1993) (noting the general position that the determination of probable cause is based on whether 
there "were enough facts within the affidavit," and that courts "are bound by the contents of the 
affidavit") This warrant authorized a search regardless of how Dr Penn responded to the offer 
of sale. The fact that Dr Penn accepted the drugs, is meaningless to this Court's analysis of the 
validity of the warrant. 
Further, despite a condition that the CFs vehicle and person would be searched prior to 
entry, and researched subsequently, there is no condition explaining what should (or should not) 
be found prior to entry of the house, nor that the mushrooms should not be present upon leaving 
the residence Thus, the warrant authonzed a search even if the defendant refused the illegal 
substance Consequently, the anticipatory information upon which the warrant was authorized 
did not show a sufficient probability that, following the triggering events, any crime would be 
committed or that any contraband would be in the named place when the actual search was 
executed 
Indeed, based on the warrant and the conditions, the defendant was required to commit 
absolutely no illegal act in order for the search to proceed All triggering events were solely in 
the hands of the agents and confidential informant Defendant could have refused the 
mushrooms, told the individuals to leave, and after being thrown out of the house with the 
mushrooms still in their custody, the warrant would have nonetheless authorized the 
agents to search the residence. Cf Womack, 967 P 2d at 539 (defendant signed for and 
accepted package). 
1x No Probable Cause To Search For All Drugs 
Further, there was no probable cause to search for "all controlled substances" based on 
one anticipated buy of mushrooms that were to be used for personal use "In addition to 
authorizing search and seizure of the contraband related to the offense, many anticipatory 
warrants also authorize search and seizure of evidence not directly related to the specific 
13 
offense on which the anticipatory warrant was issued." See Validity of Anticipatory Search 
Warrants-State Cases, 67 A.L.R.5th 361, § 2b (2002). This is so, because many courts have 
reasoned that "when a large amount of contraband has been delivered to a defendants 
premises in a controlled delivery, it is reasonable to infer that the defendant's premises will 
house additional contraband of a similar nature." Id. (emphasis added). However, probable 
cause must still exists to search for evidence from the search and seizure beyond that recovered 
in the controlled delivery or buy. See id. 
In this case, there was absolutely no admissible7 evidence that any other controlled 
substances would be found on the premises sufficient to amount to probable cause. Thus, the 
warrant's authorisation to search for any controlled substances not limited to the mushrooms is 
improper, and effectively allowed an illegal general search. 
Importantly, such authorization in this case cannot be justified by the reasoning that a 
large amount of contraband was being delivered through a controlled sale. The justification for 
a more complete search is justified in those situations where a defendant has sent narcotics to 
himself through the mail, or where controlled purchases have been ongoing and continuous and 
have amounted to the purchase of large quantities of controlled substances. This is so because 
such large quantities is indicative of drug trafficking and distribution rings. In this case, 
however, the undercover operation set up a one-time, small, controlled sale, that was clearly for 
personal use. Such a controlled sale does not justify a complete search of the Defendant's entire 
residence in hopes of finding other controlled substances. 
Further, any information given by the unknown CI cannot be relied upon to support a 
search for other substances as the affidavit supporting the warrant gave absolutely no indication 
7At the hearing on the motion to suppress the court was asked to exclude that part of the 
warrant that was alleged to have been obtained from an illegal search conducted by the 
confidential informant. The court specifically deferred consideration of that issue citing to the 
sufficiency of the anticipatory part of the warrant. 
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as to the CFs reliability, basis of knowledge, veracity and the like. 
8During the pretrial suppression hearing, this Court did not consider the reliability of the 
CI in making its decision concerning the warrant, instead finding the anticipatory portion was 
sufficient to uphold the warrant. However, the complete lack of information about the CI in the 
affidavit in support of the warrant may become important in this case, with regard to probable 
cause to search the residence for any other controlled substance but the mushrooms. 
It has been clearly held that the "veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge of 
informants is a factor to considered within the totality of the circumstances" in making probable 
cause determinations. See State v. Buford, 820 P.2d 1381, (Utah App. 1991). For example, in 
State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1989), the court found that the trial court erred in 
denying a motion to suppress, in part, due to the lack of information concerning an informant. 
The court noted: 
Neither the credibility of the informant nor the reliability of the 
information was ever established. The record reveals nothing to 
indicate how, when, or where the information was obtained. Sheriff 
Judd stated that he had used the informant previously and found 
"them" to be reliable, but there is no indication as to how many times 
this occurred, when it last occurred, the circumstances, or even 
whether it was one or more informants. 
Droneburg, 781 P.2d at 1306. 
The Court continued: 
Although the veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge of 
confidential informants are no longer strict prerequisites for 
establishing probable cause, they are still "relevant considerations, 
among others, in determining the existence of probable cause under 
'a totality-of-the-circumstances. Otherwise, a court cannot determine 
whether the information was obtained in the context of unreliable 
circumstances such as casual rumor. 
Droneburg,l%\ P.2dat 1306. 
In this case, a review of the Affidavit in support of the warrant offers absolutely no 
information concerning the CI. The magistrate was given absolutely no indication of the 
reliability or veracity of the CI; was not given the foundation or basis of knowledge for how 
the CI made his/her alleged observations; nor was the magistrate given any indication whether 
the CI made the alleged observations legally. Importantly, there is no suggestion, for a 
majority of the CI's assertions, when the observations were made, and as such, much of the 
CI's assertions of wrongdoing could have been based on stale information. Finally, the 
affidavit makes no showing of any attempt to corroborate the CI's information concerning 
improper use of prescriptions, that could justify a search for prescription medications in the 
Penn residence. 
As such, the Defendant reserves the right to amend and/or supplement his grounds for 
a new trial to include the possible CI reliability issues, as well as possible Franks issues, upon 
receipt and review of the transcript. 
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Finally, had this been a simple controlled by for $80.00 worth of mushrooms absent a 
warrant, the defendant could have admittedly been arrested for the mushroom offense. 
However, a search of the entire house would still not have been authorized "incident to arrest." 
Police reports indicate the Hydrocodone was found in the bathroom medicine cabinet, and the 
demerol was found in the refrigerator. Surely, a random search of the house incident to arrest 
would not have been authorized. See e.g., State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973 (Utah App. 1998) 
(citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) for well established proposition that search of 
area within arrestee's immediate control permissible incident to arrest, but "state must 
demonstrate that the area searched was reasonably within defendant's control" since there is no 
justification "for routinely searching any room other than that in which arrest occurs-or, for that 
matter, for searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas..."). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and those to be presented at hearing on this motion, it is 
respectfully requested that this Court grant the defendant a new trial in this matter. 
^ 
DATED this , , / day of January 2003. 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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10 West Broadway, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-5297 
Facsimile: (801) 532-5298 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
NATHANIEL FREDERICK PENN, 
Defendant. 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Case No.021700243 
(Judge Lyle Anderson) 
Defendant, through counsel, hereby submits this supplemental memorandum in support 
of his motion for new trial. In doing so, the Defendant reasserts the point and authorities set forth 
in his initial memorandum, and provides the following supplemental information and argument 
in support. 
INTRODUCTION 
As noted in the Defendant's initial memorandum, there were several errors or 
improprieties in the trial of this matter that had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of the 
Defendant. These errors fall within three general categories: 1) errors regarding the jury 
instructions given in this case at trial; 2) errors regarding the anticipatory warrant in this case and 
its execution; and 3) discovery violations on the part of the state and the failure of the 
prosecution to disclose material information to the defense. The errors regarding the jury 
instructions have been frilly briefed in the Defendant's previous memorandum. The second two 
issues will be briefed and/or supplemented herein. 
Standing alone, each error, illegality, and piece of new evidence raised herein warrants a 
new trial Some of the above issues were properly raised, objected to, and ruled upon prior to the 
trial of this matter Some were not Inasmuch as prior trial counsel failed to properly object to or 
raise any of these specific issues, such amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel which also 
forms the basis for the granting of a new trial. 
SUPPLEMENTAL RELEVANT FACTS 
Facts Relevant to the Execution of the Anticipatory Warrant 
and the Questioning of the Defendant 
1 As noted in previous memorandum, on April 19, 2002, Investigator Rob Johnson 
("Johnson") from the DEA sought and obtained an anticipatory search warrant to search the 
residence located at 300 East 300 South, in Moab, Utah 
2 Section 6 of the Affidavit is titled "Anticipatory Information" and states 
On April 20, 2002, between 10 00 and noon, DEA agents will meet with CI 
CI and an undercover agent (UC) will be searched and CI will be wired CI 
or UC will be given some psilocybin mushroom Cl's vehicle will also be 
searched CI and an undercover agent will drive in Cl's vehicle to the above 
described residence of Penn and Drew with the mushrooms Agents will 
have CI and UC under visual and audio observation at all times driving to 
and from said residence They will have CI and UC under audio observation 
while they are in the residence It is anticipated that CI and UC will offer 
Penn and/or Drew the mushrooms for sale for either cash and/or controlled 
substance prescriptions After CI and UC leave the residence, CI and UC 
and Cl's vehicle will be researched. 
(Emphasis added). 
3 Based on the affidavit, officers obtained a search warrant which stated that the 
"search warrant is valid only upon the occurrence of the events descnbed in the affidavit for this 
anticipatory search warrant." 
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4. Investigator Robert Johnson has testified under oath1 regarding the circumstances 
concerning the search and arrest of Mr Penn2 In doing so, Johnson stated the following 
a. As soon as LaPlante and Bacon left the Penn residence after the 
controlled sale, and were away from the door, an entry team immediately went into the 
residence and secured the home, including handcuffing Penn. See id at 17-20 
b. Johnson is not aware of anyone searching LaPlante or Bacon prior to the 
entry into the Penn residence to execute the warrant. See id at 20-22. 
c. Johnson is not aware of anyone searching LaPlante's vehicle prior to the 
entry into Penn's residence to execute the warrant See id at 21-22. 
d. When Johnson goes into the residence, Penn has already been handcuffed 
and is seated at the kitchen table. See id at 20:10-20, 81, 85. 
e. The officers indicated that they knew Penn had just purchased 
mushrooms, that they had a search warrant, and that it would be to his benefit to tell where they 
were because the officers would find them anyway. See id at 82. 
'AH testimony offered herein was given during the course of depositions which were 
conducted as part of a civil suit- Gene and Lisa LaPlante v Nathaniel Penn Case No 2 03CV-
00125DAK. All testimony is under oath and is attached hereto Generally the lawsuit alleges 
Penn's malpractice in treating Gene LaPlante. Lisa LaPlante has alleged that Dr Perm's medical 
malpractice caused her husband, to threaten her with an automatic assault rifle In order to get 
her husband out of trouble, she alleges that she was forced to make a deal with the DEA, and 
therefore, Dr. Penn is liable for alleged damages she suffered as a consequence of her service as 
a DEA agent. 
The excerpts attached and included herein are offered on topics about which there 
appears to be no factual dispute. The State has been given advance notice that the transcripts 
woult oe offered at the hearing on the motion for new trial However, if the Court or the State 
wants the witnesses to appear and provide live testimony, they can be present with some advance 
notice 
2The relevant portions of the Deposition of Robert Johnson, dated May 9, 2003, 
referenced herein are attached as "Exhibit A." 
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f. In response, Perm indicated that the mushrooms were in a kitchen drawer 
See id. 
g. Subsequently, officers mirandized Penn, and asked if he wanted to give a 
statement. See id.. Penn indicated he wanted an attorney at that time. See id. 
5. The confidential informant, Lisa LaPlante, has testified under oath concerning 
this matter.3 In doing so, she stated the following: 
a. As part of the controlled sale, Ms. LaPlante went into the Penn residence 
with undercover agent Mark Bacon. See Deposition of Lisa LaPlante, dated May 28, 2003 at 72-
73. 
b. After leaving the house, and within seconds, agents immediately "flew in 
from everywhere." Id. at 73:23, 75. 
c. LaPlante was not searched before the warrant was executed and prior 
to officers entering Penn's residence. See id. at 74:4-9. In fact, LaPlante confirms that she was 
not re-searched until after the agents entered the defendant's house to execute the warrant. See 
id at 74-10-12. 
d. La Plante's vehicle was not searched between the time she left Penn's 
residence and other agents entered. See id. at 75:9-24. 
Facts Relating to Illegal Search and Discovery Violations 
Regarding Lisa LaPIante's Role As An Agent of Police 
6. In January of 2002, Ms. LaPlante had a meeting with Mr. Bill Benge, and agreed 
to become a confidential informant. See Deposition of Lisa LaPlante at 34-36; Deposition of 
3The relevant portions of the Deposition of Lisa LaPlante, dated May 28, 2003, 
referenced herein, are attached as "Exhibit B." 
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Gene Laplante, dated May 27, 2003, at 197.4 
7. Ms. LaPlante agreed to become an information so that pending felony charges 
against her husband, Gene LaPlante, would "go away." Id. at 35:11-18; 37. See also Deposition 
of Gene Laplante at 191-193 (noting he was charged with felony aggravated assault concerning 
an incident on January 9, 2002 involving displaying a firearm toward his wife). The arrangement 
was that the charges would "go away" if LaPlante agreed to help in the government's 
investigation of Dr. Penn. See Deposition of Lisa LaPlante at 36:7-12; 37; Deposition of Gene 
LaPlante at 193-197. Additionally, Ms. Laplante received financial payment for her cooperation. 
See Deposition of Gene Laplante at 199. 
8. Ms. LaPlante agreed to cooperate in the investigation concerning Dr. Penn. See 
Deposition of Lisa LaPlante at 33-36. Subsequently, Ms. LaPlante submitted reports concerning 
Dr. Penn. See id. at 37. 
9. Months later, Ms. LaPlante spoke to Officer Johnson and Bacon in a meeting at 
her house. See id. at 38-39. There, she signed an agreement with the DEA to become an 
undercover agent. See id. at 53:1-7. 
10. After becoming an agent, Ms. LaPlante went into the Penn residence under the 
pretenses of "looking for a key" to a shed. See id. at 56:7-10. 
11. Ms. LaPlante never retrieved the key or the records she claimed she was looking 
for. See id. at 56:21-22. 
12. Instead of looking for the key, Ms. LaPlante searched the refrigerator and 
bathroom cabinets to look for Demerol and Lortab. See id. at 57. Such information was part of 
4The relevant portions of the Deposition of Gene LaPlante, dated May 27, 2003, 
referenced herein, are attached as "Exhibit C." 
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the information Ms. LaPlante was expected to provide to the DEA. See id at 57.16-18 Ms 
LaPlante admitted she was 'looking to see if there were drugs in there to report to the DEA.11 Id 
13. Ms. LaPlante admitted that she initially went in the residence to look for the key, 
but decided to expand the search for the purpose of looking for evidence of drug possession. See 
id at 59-10-14. Ms. LaPlante admits that she received permission from Drew only to search for 
the key See id at 60:2-9. 
14. The very day Ms. LaPlante made her observations, she told the DEA agents See 
id at 60-15-22. 
15 Ms. Laplante's indication that she had seen controlled substances in Dr. Perm's 
house was used as support of probable cause in the affidavit in support of the search warrant. 
See Deposition of Robert Johnson, dated May 9, 2003, at 60-62; Affidavit in Support of Search 
Warrant. 
16. Prior to trial, on July 16, 2002, defense counsel Greg Skordas, filed a motion for 
discovery under Utah rule of Criminal procedure 16 requesting, ''evidence known to the 
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the Defendant, or 
mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced punishment," as well as any "recordings, reports, 
transcripts, or reports about statements in possession of any member, or group involved in the 
prosecution or investigation of the ... case taken from the witnesses..." See Request For 
Discovery, dated July 16, 2002. 
17. TttiState never disclosed to trial counsel the "deal" that had been reached 
between Lisa LaPlante and the State regarding Ms. LaPlante's aid in the investigation of the 
matter and her testimony at trial, and never provided the records of payment. See Affidavit of 
Gregory Skordas, attached as "Exhibit D." 
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18. Additionally, it has recently become known that investigators prepared additional 
reports in this matter that may have contained exculpatory information that was not disclosed in 
discovery See Deposition of Robert Johnson, at 31, 39-40, 45 (affirming that reports were 
generated concerning interviews with Ms. Angie Stoughton, Ms Mane Packard, and pharmacist 
Mr Mike Goyne, and that Ms. Stoughton and Packard had some favorable things to say about 
Penn) See also, Affidavit of Gregory Skordas. 
ARGUMENT 
I. A NEW TRIAL IS WARRANTED BECAUSE THE 
ANTICIPATORY WARRANT WAS INVALID, NOT 
SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE, AND WAS 
IMPROPERLY EXECUTED. 
In previous memorandum, the Defendant has asserted that the anticipatory search warrant 
issued in this case was invalid and illegally executed for several reasons. See Memorandum in 
Support of New Trial. Therein, the Defendant asserted that the warrant, on the face of its four 
corners, did not establish probable cause that a crime would likely be committed because the 
warrant authorizes a search based solely on an "offer" of illegal substances and there is a 
complete absence of any condition establishing a likelihood that the defendant would "acquire 
possession" of drugs. See id. at 12-13. 
Previous memorandum has also noted that the affidavit in support of the warrant was 
wholly void of any information regarding the reliability, basis of knowledge, and veracity of the 
CI, and therefore, the warrant is invalid. See id at 14-15, and n 8 
The Defendant has also relied on the proposition, which is supplemented herein, that 
because the requisite "triggerng events" did not occur, the warrant, again, is invalid and all 
evidence seized as a result of the warrant should have been suppressed. 
The warrant is also called into question for a separate and distinct reason: some of the 
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information used in the warrant to support probable cause was obtained by the CI at a time 
where the CI illegally searched Defendant's residence while operating as an agent of the 
government. As such, any evidence that the CI discovered was illegally obtained and/or relied 
upon in support of the search warrant in this case should have been omitted, and without such 
information, and based on the problems already noted with the warrant and affidavit, there was 
insufficient information to establish probable cause. 
Finally, upon execution of the search warrant, the investigators improperly questioned 
Mr. Penn in violation of Miranda, and as such, all statements he allegedly made should have 
been suppressed. 
Based on all of these reasons, this Court should find that the warrant in this case was 
invalid and improperly executed, thus rendering any evidence obtained as a result improperly 
admitted at trial. Accordingly, this Court should grant Defendant's Motion for a New Trial. 
A. The Anticipatory Warrant Was Invalid 
JL The Requisite Triggering Events 
Never Occurred. 
As stated in previous memorandum, an "anticipatory warrant is invalid if the triggering 
event does not arise." State v. Womack, 967 P.2d 536, 544 (Utah 1998). Clearly, in this case, the 
anticipatory warrant was prematurely executed before the requisite "triggering events" occurred. 
Despite the explicit language that the warrant is "valid only upon the occurrence of the 
events described in the affidavit," the requisite re-searching of La Plante, the undercover 
agent, and La Planters vehicle did not take place before the warrant was executed and the 
warrant is therefore rendered invalid and its execution illegal. Simply put-the triggering events 
making the search proper never occurred. Consequently, the evidence obtained pursuant to the 
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invalid warrant should have been suppressed, and failure to suppress had a substantial adverse 
effect on the defendant's right to a fair trial This Court should therefore grant defendant a new 
trial pursuant to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(a). 
2L The Anticipatory Warrant Was Not Properly 
Supported By Probable Cause Since Information 
Illegally Obtained Should Have Been Omitted 
Another problem with the warrant in this case, is that it was supported, in part, by 
information that was obtained illegally by the confidential informant who was acting as an agent 
of the police.5 
"The fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures protects 
only against governmental actions and does not extend to the independent acts of private 
citizens.MS/ate v McArthur, 996 P 2d 555, 560 (Utah App 2000) (quoting State v Watts, 750 
P 2d 1219, 1220 (Utah 1988)). "However, a search conducted by a private person acting as a 
government agent is not a private search "McArthur, 996 P 2d at 560 (internal quotations and 
brackets omitted). " In such an instance, the protections of the fourth amendment do have 
application " Id See also, State v Watts, 750 P 2d 1219 (Utah 1988) (setting forth framework of 
agency relationship), State v Koury, 824 P 2d 474 (Utah App 1991) (same) 
Additionally, and important to the issues in this case, although "the Fourth Amendment 
allows undercover police agents to conduct warrantless searches in places to which they have 
been invited, the Fourth Amendment requires that the search not exceed the scope of the 
5More specifically, the affidavit in support of the warrant states* 
Approximately two weeks ago, CI was in the residence described 
above as 300 East 300 South, Moab, Grand County, Utah, and saw 
some multi-dose vials of Demerol in their refrigerator CI also saw 
some oxycontin in a prescription bottle, labeled with the name of 
Robert Silver, in the bathroom. 
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invitation " Id at 562. "If he or she is invited onto private property, a government agent does 
not need probable cause nor warrant to enter so long as he does not exceed the scope of his 
invitation " Id. Indeed, once "inside the house, an agent may not exceed the scope of his 
invitation by ransacking the house generally, but he may seize anything in plain view " Id 
(internal brackets omitted) 
In this case, the confidential informant was acting as an agent at the time of the search 
By this time, Ms LaPlante had already entered into an arrangement with the prosecutor for 
information in the investigation of Dr Penn. Ms LaPlante's testimony clearly shows that she 
was motivated in searching the Penn residence for narcotics in order to provide such information 
to the DEA Further, LaPlante entered the premises under the pretense of searching for a key, 
and while in the residence, looked in closed containers and private areas for evidence Notably, 
areas where a key is unlikely to be found. 
Thus, any information in the warrant obtained as a result of this illegal search should 
have been stricken. Cf State v Nielsen, 111 P 2d 188, 191 (Utah 1986) (noting that "if an 
affidavit fails to support a finding of probable cause after the false statements are excised or the 
omitted information is added, the omission or misstatement materially affects the finding of 
probable cause, any evidence obtained under the improperly issued warrant must be 
suppressed") This illegally obtained information, in conjunction with the problems of the 
warrant noted above, and in Defendant's initial memorandum regarding probable cause in 
general and the absolute lack of information about the CI, renders the affidavit in support of the 
warrant wholly lacking in probable cause, and therefore all evidence obtained as a result of this 
warrant should have been suppressed. Consequently, improper information was presented to the 
jury and a new trial is warranted 
3. Insofar as The Issues Concerning The 
Warrant's Invalidity Was Not Raised Bv 
Prior Counsel. Such Constitutes Ineffective 
Assistance Of Counsel. 
Trial counsel filed a motion to suppress in this case on September 5, 2002. Therein, 
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counsel argued that the warrant lacked probable cause since there "was no more than mere 
speculation that the Defendant would purchase the mushrooms from the DEA agent and 
therefore have them in his possession/1 See Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress, at 4. The memorandum further explains, that the warrant was improper since there was 
no more in the warrant affidavit than "an offer," and as such, there was "no statement or 
assurance that the defendant would purchase the substance or that he would subsequently [have] 
anything in his possession." Id. at n.l. 
Although prior counsel did file a motion to suppress, insofar as Mr. Skordas failed to 
appropriately and fully raise the additional issues surrounding the warrant now presented to & -> 
Court, such constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel and a new trial is warranted. 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... have assistance of 
counsel for his defense." U.S. Const., amend VI. See also State v Templin, 805 P 2d 182, 186 
(Utah 1990). "The right to counsel has been held to be 'the right to effective assistance of 
counsel.'" Id (citations omitted). Utah courts follow the standard set forth in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U S. 668, 687 (1984). See Templin, 805 P 2d at 186. 
Importantly, the failure to file a motion to suppress evidence can form the basis for an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See, Kimmelman v Morrison, 477 U S 365 (1986), 
State v Snyder, 860 P 2d 351 (Utah App. 1993) (failure to timely file a meritorious motion to 
suppress statements on Miranda grounds requires new trial). To prevail on this claim, the 
defendant must demonstrate that the motion was meritorious and would have affected the 
outcome of the trial. 
As note4£Nrviously, failure to raise the issues surrounding the warrant and its probable 
cause determination now presented to this Court fall below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. Importantly, as set forth above in detail, a motion to suppress should have been 
filed outlining the numerous issues regarding the warrant's shortcomings, including the facts that 
the triggering events never occurred, that the warrant was substantially based on information by 
a CI in which there was absolutely no information as to the basis of knowledge, or veracity, and 
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the fact that some of the information contained in the affidavit was based on an illegal search 
Such claims are meritorious, justify suppression oft he evidence seized in this case, and would 
have clearly affected the outcome of the trial. 
B. Any Statement Made by Penn Should Have Been 
Suppressed as Obtained in Violation of Miranda. 
Once a person is "in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way," it is incumbent upon the police to provide Miranda warnings before seeking to 
elicit incriminating statements from the in-custody defendant Accord Miranda v Arizona, 384 
US 436, 444(1966). 
Here, Mr Penn was clearly in custody At the time of the questioning concerning 
the contraband, officers had entered Mr Penn's residence, and Penn had been handcuffed and 
placed under the direct supervision of at least one police officer while other officers searched his 
home. 
He was not free to leave and was suspected of criminal activity Additionally, there was 
express questioning regarding the location of the contraband inside the house with "words and 
actions" likely to elicit a response. Officers asked repeatedly where the drugs were located, and 
when Mr Penn denied knowledge, the officers replied that they knew he had just purchased the 
mushrooms, that they had a search warrant, and that it would be to his benefit to tell where they 
were because the officers would find them anyway In that situation, the police were required to 
provide the Miranda safeguards. 
Based on these facts, the failure to give Miranda warnings would have resulted in the 
suppression of Penn's initial statement to the police at his home had trial counsel filed a motion 
to suppress. 
Moreover, based on authority stated previously, trial counsel's failure to raise such issue 
constitutes ineffective assistance. See State v Snyder, 860 P 2d 351 (Utah App. 1993) (failure to 
timely file a meritorious motion to suppress statements on Miranda grounds requires new trial) 
A reading of the police reports and testimony from the preliminary hearing should have at least 
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prompted counsel to conduct flirther investigation or file the motion to suppress There could be 
no tactical reason not to seek suppression, because trial counsel did seek to exclude evidence on 
other unrelated theories. Had trial counsel filed a motion to suppress the statements on Fifth 
Amendment grounds, there is a strong likelihood that this motion would have been granted 
II. THE STATE'S NONDISCLOSURE OF THE DEAL 
BETWEEN THE STATE AND A MATERIAL STATE 
WITNESS REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
A. Law Regarding Prosecutorial Duty 
To Disclose Evidence. 
"It is well settled that the government has the obligation to turn over evidence in its 
possession that is both favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment " 
Pennsylvania v Ritchie, 480 U S. 39, 57 (1987) A prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory 
evidence violates a defendant's rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Seeeg, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U S. 83 (1963); 
Kyles v Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995); United States v Augurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). These legal 
principles apply equally in the consideration of the state due process clause under Article I, 
Section 7 of the Utah State Constitution. See, eg Walker v State, 624 P 2d 687 (Utah 1981) 
"In a criminal trial it is essential that evidence which tends to exonerate the defendant be aired as 
fully as that which tends to implicate him." State v Jarrell, 608 P 2d 218, 225 (Utah 1980)6 
6In addition, under Utah discovery law, upon request by the defendant, the prosecution is 
required to disclose I) the relevant written or recorded statements of a co-defendant, and 2) 
evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt 
of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced punishment. "The prosecutor 
has a continuing duty to make disclosure." U R.Cr P , Rule 16(b), Parson v Galetka, 57 
FSupp2d 1151 (D.Utah 1995). 
Rule 16(g) of the Utah Rule of criminal procedure also provides broad authority to the 
trial court to remedy a violation of the discovery rules State v Larson, 775 P.2d 415 (Utah 
1989). That rule reads: "If at any time during the course of the proceedings, it is brought to the 
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with [Rule 16], the court may order such 
party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from 
introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the 
circumstances." [emphasis added.] A new trial may be ordered upon a violation of discovery 
under Rule 16. State v Martin, 1999 UT 72, 984 P 2d 975 (Martin I) [new trial denied on 
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This obligation to disclose applies equally to impeachment evidence and to evidence that 
was not requested by the defense. See Stnckler v Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999), United 
States v Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,676(1985); Gighov United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).7 
Moreover, the "state's obligation to disclose is not limited to information in the custody 
of the prosecutor." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437. "The law imposes a duty upon the individual 
prosecutor to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's 
behalf in the case, including the police." Id, This is so because the "prosecution, which alone 
can know what is undisclosed, must be assigned the consequent responsibility to gauge the likely 
net effect of all such evidence and make disclosure when the point of'reasonable probability' is 
reached." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437. As such, there is no leeway to hold back evidence because of 
uncertainty about whether the evidence would prove exculpatory at trial. "[T]he government 
simply cannot avoid responsibility for knowing when the suppression of evidence has come to 
portend such an effect on a trial's outcome as to destroy confidence in its result." Id at 439. 
This is consistent with the Court's long held view that "a prudent prosecutor will resolve 
doubtful questions in favor of disclosure." Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108. See also, State v Bakalov, 
1999 UT 45, P38 ("It is not for a prosecutor to substitute his or her judgment for that of a 
defendant with respect to whether exculpatory evidence is sufficiently material to warrant 
disclosure... Where a judgment call must be made...doubts should be resolved in favor of 
disclosure"). 
B. Applicable Standard For New Trial 
Based on Non-Disclosure. 
violation of this rule solely because defendant did not make a Rule 16 request]. 
7As noted, the United States Supreme Court has also applied this rule to impeachment 
evidence. See eg., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). This is so because "[wjhen 
the 'reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence' non-
disclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within th[e] general rule of Brady" 405 U.S. at 
154. See also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676 (explaining that "such evidence is 'evidence favorable to 
an accused,'... so that, if disclosed and used effectively, it may make the difference between 
conviction and acquittal"). 
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Failure of the prosecution to disclose evidence warrants a new trial where there is 
prejudice to the Defendant. See Strickler, 527 U S at 281-82 Prejudice occurs when the State's 
failure to disclose affects the Defendant's fundamental rights-such as a right to a fair trial See 
United States v Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985). A Defendant's right to a fair trial is 
undermined when the undisclosed evidence is material, meaning, where "there is reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different." Id at 682. 
A "showing of materiality" however, "does not require demonstration by a prepond-
erance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the 
defendant's acquittal" Kyles v Whitley, 514 U S 419, 434(1995) The question is "not whether 
the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, 
but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a 
verdict worthy of confidence." Id. (emphasis added). 
Further, a "defendant need not demonstrate that after discounting the inculpatory 
evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, there would not have been enough left to convict 
The possibility of an acquittal on a criminal charge does not imply an insufficient evidentiary 
basis to convict." Id at 435. 
C. Evidence Not Disclosed By The Prosecution 
Requires a New Trial.' 
insofar as tnal counsel did not specifically question the witness at trial regarding any 
deals made with the prosecution, such constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel based on a 
failure to properly investigate and impeach the witness See Strickland, 466 U S at 690 
(discussing tnal counsel duty to investigate); Taylor v Warden, 905 P 2d 277, 283 (Utah 1995) 
("Sufficient performance requires that counsel adequately investigate the underlying facts of the 
case"), State v Tyler, 850 P2d 1250,1255 (Utah 1993), State v Temphn, 805 P 2d 182, 188 
(Utah 1990)). 
Further, several jurisdictions find that the failure to impeach a witness may constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel. See eg., Moffett v Kolb, 930 F 2d 1156, 1160 (7th Cir.1991) 
(finding that failure to question witness on inconsistent statements constituted ineffective 
assistance); Nixon v Newsome, 888 F 2d 112, 116 (1 Ith Cir 1989) (stating that court would 
"have no difficulty concluding that the attorney's actions were not within the wide range of 
professional competence" especially when faced "with glaring" discrepancies between testimony 
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In this case, the State failed to disclose material information in violation of its duty, 
including: 1) the deal stricken between Ms Laplante and the prosecution for her aide m the 
investigation and testimony, including any monetary payments made to her; and 2) investigative 
reports of interviews of three witnesses that seemingly had exculpatory information. 
First, evidence of the "deal" between the State and Ms. LaPlante should have been 
disclosed, and goes directly to the credibility of LaPlante's testimony Such information would 
have clearly affected counsel's preparation for tnal and presentation of the case to the jury 
Further, Ms. LaPlante was the most important witness of the State's case, and a detailed attack 
on her credibility based on this undisclosed information would have likely resulted in a different 
outcome. 
Further, it has recently become known that investigators prepared additional reports in 
this matter that may have contained exculpatory information that was not disclosed to the 
defense More specifically, Investigator Johnson has indicated that he personally prepared 
reports of interviews with Angle Stoughton, Mane Packard, and pharmacist. Mike Goyne 
Counsel has yet to see those reports in order to judge the materiality of such evidence, but, 
according to Johnson, the witnesses had some "favorable" things to say. 
CONCLUSION 
In Sum, throughout the Defendant1 initial memorandum and this supplemental 
memorandum, the Defendant urges this Court to grant a new trial for numerous reasons, 
including: 
1) the jury instructions given in this case were plainly erroneous and deprived 
Defendant Penn the right to a fair tnal; 
2) the anticipatory warrant in this matter was invalid, not supported by probable 
during two hearings); State v Simpson, 946 P.2d 890, 892 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997) (finding 
ineffective assistance where attorney did not make tactical decision but completely failed to 
perceive the worth of the impeachment information he had before him). But see, State v 
Maestas, 997 P 2d 314, 319 (Utah App. 2000), cert denied, 4 P 3d 1289 (Utah 2000) (finding no 
ineffective assistance in failure to impeach where no prejudice shown). 
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cause, and improperly executed because 
a. the "triggering events11 necessary to the validity of the anticipatory 
warrant never occurred; 
b. the warrant, on the face of its four corners, did not establish 
probable cause that a crime would likely be committed because the warrant authonzes a search 
based solely on an "offer" of illegal substances by the CI and undercover agent, and there is an 
absence of any condition that established a likelihood that the defendant would "acquire 
possession" of the drugs; 
c. the affidavit in support of the warrant was wholly void of any 
information regarding the reliability, basis of knowledge, and veracity of the CI, and 
d. some of the information relied upon by the police officers in 
establishing probable cause for the warrant was obtained as a result of an illegal search 
performed by the CI as an agent of the police, and should have been omitted, and 
e. statements made by Penn while he was handcuffed at his residence 
dunng the time of the search should have been suppressed since such statements were obtained 
in violation of Miranda v Arizona', 
3) the State improperly failed to disclose exculpatory information regarding a 
deal made with a matenal witness that goes to the heart of the witness's credibility, and other 
information from additional witnesses recently made known to the Defendant. 
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests that this 
Court grant the Defendant's motion and order a new tnal in this matter. 
DATED this / ^flay of June 2003 
'JAMBS*; 'BRADSHAW 
Atto/ney for Defendant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL was mailed, postage 
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the JQ day of June 2003. 




THE SEVENTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
NATHANIEL F. PENN, 
Defendant, 
RULING ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Case No.0217-243 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
Defendant, Nathaniel Penn ("Penn"), has moved the court for 
a new trial. The State objected. The Court addresses each 
argument in turn. 
VALIDITY OF WARRANT 
Penn complains that the search warrant that led to the 
discovery of illegal drugs in his home was invalid. Penn 
challenged the validity of the warrant before his trial and that 
challenge was denied. Penn renews some of the same arguments 
raised before trial and some new arguments as well. 
The Court sees no reason to change its analysis of the 
arguments raised earlier. As to the arguments raised now for tne 
first time, those arguments are rejected because: 
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1. Even though the affidavit failed to recite that the 
officers expected Penn to accept the offer of drugs, 
the affidavit does give good reason to believe that he 
would accept the offer. The magistrate clearly 
intended that acceptance of the offer would be the 
trigger for execution of the warrant, and the conduct 
of the officers shows that they understood this as 
well. 
2. Even though the affiant said that the confidential 
informant and her car would be searched, the warrant 
did not clearly specify that the search must occur 
before the warrant would be valid. Had that question 
been specifically addressed, this Court is confident 
that the magistrate would not have conditioned the 
warrant's validity on the search having previously 
occurred, especially given that a DEA agent was to 
personally participate m the transaction. 
3. With regards to the psiiocybm possession charge, the 
evidence against Penn was overwhelming, even without 
the mushrooms themselves. 
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PENN'S STATEMENT 
Penn has not persuaded the Court that the failure of his 
previous counsel to seek to suppress his pre-Miranda statements 
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. It is not obvious 
that Penn was in custody at the time he was asked about the 
location of the drugs. In addition, the Court does not believe 
that Penn suffered any prejudice at trial from admission of his 
pre-Miranda statements. 
THE DEAL BETWEEN THE STATE AND GENE AND LISA LAPLANTE 
Penn has presented evidence from depositions in a civil case 
that the prosecutor agreed to dismiss aggravated assault charges 
against Gene LaPlante in exchange for Lisa LaPlante's cooperation 
with law enforcement. Penn has presented no evidence that other 
charges against Gene LaPlant were part of the deal. Penn's trial 
counsel elicited testimony at trial that Gene LaPlante was 
permitted to plead guilty to Threatening With a Dangerous Weapon, 
a Class A Misdemeanor, a lesser offense of Aggravated Assault, a 
Third Degree Felony, and that his plea was held in abeyance, with 
eventual dismissal if Gene LaPlante complied with certain 
conditions unrelated to this case. The Court's records in that 
case, of which the Court takes notice, support this testimony. 
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It is evident from the record that Penn's trial counsel knew 
of the disposition of the charges against Gene LaPlante. It is 
also evident that he chose to use evidence of Gene LaPlante's 
charge and conviction in two ways. First, counsel attempted to 
portray Lisa LaPlante as a person affected by her unreasonable 
anger towards Penn. His theory was that Lisa was angry at Penn 
for calling the police when Gene threatened her with a gun. 
Second, though not strictly relevant to the issues in the case, 
counsel attempted to portray Lisa LaPlante as an ungrateful 
recipient of Penn's generosity. Counsel never asked LaPlante 
whether she had received any promises in exchange for her 
testimony. Indeed, since Gene LaPlante's case had been disposed 
of already, there would have been little reason for the jury to 
give such evidence significant weight. Penn's trial counsel 
correctly chose the more productive approach of using evidence of 
Gene LaPlantefs charges to portray Lisa LaPlante as vindictive 
and ungrateful. This strategy was not objectively unreasonable 
THE THREE WITNESSES 
Penn complained that witness statement of Angie Stoughton, 
Marie Packard, and Robert Silver were not disclosed and contained 
"favorable" statements about Penn The Court has reviewed those 
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written statements, and finds nothing there that would have 
helped Penn that was not presented to the ]ury. 
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
This case presented an interesting question; a doctor 
possessing and dispensing prescription drugs without following 
the procedures outlined in statutes governing prescriptions of 
drugs. The evidence was undisputed that Penn did not fill out 
the forms required by law to acquire narcotics for dispensing in 
his clinic. Instead, he wrote prescriptions for office 
employees, even though the employee did not need the narcotic, 
and then had the employee bring the drug back to the office. 
Undisputed evidence also was introduced that some patients of 
Penn brought unused portions of narcotic prescriptions back to 
Penn and that Penn dispensed those narcotics. Whether Penn 
required that any record of such dispensing be kept was disputed. 
The Court sought input from Penn's trial counsel concerning 
how to instruct the jury about the charges of illegal possession 
of prescription drugs. While Penn now claims that failing to 
keep records of dispensing is at rose a misdemeanor, that was not 
his position at trial. He may well have elected to accede to the 
language proposed by the Court in order to avoid different, less 
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favorable language. For example, the ]ury might have been 
instructed that any doctor who acquires narcotics for office use 
by writing a prescription for an employee without medical need is 
possessing the narcotic illegally. 
Utah's appellate courts have given no guidance on how to 
instruct a jury in a case like this. In the absence of clear 
authority, the decision of Penn's counsel to accept language that 
was arguably more favorable than other alternatives is not 
objectively unreasonable. Penn cannot now be permitted to second 
guess that decision and obtain a new trial with a different 
instruction, followed if necessary by a third trial with yet a 
third version of the instructions. 
The motion for new trial is denied. 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
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specified. 
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instruction, possession instructions. 
Now a hard question. When is the doctor 
illegally possessed of a controlled substance? That's 
what I can tell the jurors have been thinking ahead and 
struggling with that. When it's a substance that can be 
legally possessed. I looked at the code, and what I saw 
was that a doctor has to have a prescription for his own 
use, the same as anybody else. (Inaudible). 
MR. BENGE: Yes. 
MR. SKORDAS: For his own use? 
THE COURT: For his own use. 
MR. SKORDAS: Sure. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SKORDAS: For his personal use. 
THE COURT: For personal use. And I also -- I 
also interpreted the statute to permit practitioners who 
are licensed to prescribe to also maintain a supply on 
hand to dispense or administer. Do you both agree with 
that? 
MR. SKORDAS: Yes. 
MR. BENGE: If it complies with the record 
keeping. 
THE COURT: And then they have to keep 
records, right. Okay. 
Now, what I -- just what I've worked out at 
CitiCourt, LLC 
801.532.3441 
1 tnis point on that subject is physicians licensed or 
2 practiced to prescribe controlled substances must 3:_1 
3 obtain a prescription for controlled substances for 
4 personal use. physicians licensed to dispense or 
5 administer controlled substances are also permitted to 
6 possess reasonable quantities of controlled substances 
7 for dispensing or administering to patients, but they 
3 are required to keep a record of controlled substances 
9 received for that purpose and dispensed or administered 
10 by them as physicians A physician who fails to follov 
11 this requirement is possessing those substances 
12 illegally. 
13 And that rela:es back to an element in the 
14 instruction, elements in the instruction I say that the 
15 state has to prove that it was possessed without a 
16 prescription or without otherwise complying That so.na 
17 about right to you° (Inaudible) actual language 
13 MR. SKORDAS: Right. I think so 
19 MR. BENGE: I think so. 
20 THE COURT: Okay Those are the only things 
21 that I had questions about betore I start the typevr^ter 
22 going. Anything either of you //ant to bring out at t^.s 
23 point that I can try to incorporate in the instructions 
24 that's kind of popped up since9 I'm going to shortcut 
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THE COURT: Please be seated. 
Counsel, have you seen the instructions I 
propose to give? 
MR. SKORDAS: Yes, your Honor. 
MR. BENGE: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any exceptions, any problems? 
MR. BENGE: No exceptions. 
THE COURT: Mr. Skordas? 
MR. SKORDAS: A couple, your Honor. 
They're not numbered, but there are a few, so 
I submitted some proposed jury instructions, and I 
assumed that those are part of the Court's records. 
THE COURT: I have them. 
MR. SKORDAS: There's a ]ury instruction thai 
begins, your Honor, it's about number seven or eighi, 
hydrocodone and meperidine are controlled substances 
it's a very short instruction. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. SKORDAS: And may be legally prescribed. 
I would only ask that that be amended to say, may be 
legally prescribed and legally possessed. The next 
sentence talks about legally prescribed and legally 
possessed, and I would ask the Court to make that 
amendment to that instruction. 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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With respect to the next page --
THE COURT: I'll make that change. 
MR. SKORDAS: -- I would ask the Court to 
strike the very last sentence. 
THE COURT: Why? 
MR. SKORDAS: Well, because the law, I think 
what the Court's attempted to do is to restate the 
statute, and the statute speaks for itself. 
THE COURT: So you want me to give the statute 
to the jury to read? 
MR. SKORDAS: No, no. I want you to quit at 
the end of the statute, which is what you would have 
done had you not added that last sentence. That sort of 
is the statute. You paraphrased it, but I think in a 
way that makes sense logically to the jurors, and that 
would be my only request with respect to that 
ins t rue t ion. 
MR. BENGE: I guess I would ask that it 
remain. I think in the rest of the course of the 
instructions it explains things in the alternative. If 
you find this, you find that, if you don't find this, 
you find that. I think that that shows both sides of 
the issue. 
THE COURT: I put it in to link up the illegal 
language in the elements instruction with something that 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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defines that. In order to prevent the jury from saying 
well, okay, he's supposed to do that. He's permitted t: 
do that. If he doesn't do it, is it illegal? I think 
it's obvious, but I've had enough jurors ask me 
questions like that, that I felt I better state the 
obvious so they can watch that if they find this on you: 
exception. That is noted but overruled. I think it's 
important to (inaudible). 
MR. SKORDAS: The next instruction 
(inaudible) . 
THE COURT: You want me to give that one? 
That was sort of iffy whether you want me to or not. I 
won't give that if you don't want me to, Mr. Skordas, 
but I think it helps your client more than it 
( inaudible) . 
MR. SKORDAS: I was bothered by it until I 
read it enough times, and I agree. (Inaudible). I 
guess I'm a skeptic when I see things. 
There's an instruction about five later that 
begins, although a person. It's a three-paragraph 
ins truction. 
THE COURT: That's the nonexclusive. 
MR. SKORDAS: Correct. I would simply ask the 
Court to strike the final paragraph in its entirety. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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MR. SKORDAS: My basis for that is I'm not 
sure that's -- where we get that. I guess that follows 
common sense reasoning, and maybe the Court was trying 
to direct the jury, but I'm just a little concerned that 
it may tend to too closely track the facts of this case. 
THE COURT: I think that comes from one of 
those early (inaudible) decisions (inaudible). 
MR. BENGE: I know I've seen it a number of 
times in instruction packets, and I'm pretty sure it's 
straight out of the case law, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I think one of the appellate 
courts listed the time factor. This is a gray area. 
How much you should tell jurors about what kind of 
things they may consider, but I think that the concept 
is that they are (inaudible) it's important to give ther 
an idea what things to look for. Certainly if you think 
there are other factors that ought to be thrown in or 
some that are poorly (inaudible), mentioned in this 
case, I think I think it is important to tell them the 
kinds of things they can look at. 
So your exception is noted and overruled on 
that . 
MR. SKORDAS: Let me make certain that is all 
I have. 




through its questioning is concerned about, I den' 
how to cure, this but I don't think the instructions zz 
a -- they're concerned about whether you can illegally 
obtain prescriptions at the clinic some months or days 
or weeks prior to the time it was charged, but what 
we're dealing with is whether he illegally possessed 
them April 20th at the home that he and Cindy Drew lived 
in in Moab. 
THE COURT: Maybe I can add that to the 
instruction about defendant has not been charged with 
illegally distributing or prescribing. (Inaudible) this 
case is about, it's not about any of that other stuff. 
It's about whether he legally possessed these drugs on 
this date at this location. 
MR. SKORDAS: That would probably crystallize 
my concerns. 
THE COURT: This case is about whether 
defendant possessed psilocin, hydrocodone, and/or 
Demerol on April 20th, 2002. 
MR. BENGE: Is that going to go -- is this an 
instruction of the defendant: has not been charged with 
illegally prescribing controlled substances? Is this 
going right at the end? 
THE COURT: Yeah. At the Cindy Drew 
residence. It is not about whether he violated -- did 
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something wrong on some other dates. How about that7 
MR. SK0RDA5: That's fine. 
MR. BENGE: That's fine. 
THE COURT: All right. I'll make that change. 
That makes, I think, three instructions that I'm making 
a change to. I'll fold the corners down so you can find 
them quickly. 
What I propose to do with the verdict form 13 
just have one page with each count for them to choose 
(inaudible). Is that all right? 
MR. SKORDAS: Yes. May I say something for 
the record? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. SKORDAS: Obviously my client is not here 
this morning. I talked to him about the nature of this 
proceeding this morning before 8:00. He's asked that 
his appearance be waived, and I'd like to put that on 
the record before he shows up. I don't think it was 
necessary for him to be present. 
THE COURT: No. This is something we could 
have done in chambers. 
MR. SKORDAS: Thank you. 
MR. BENGE: Your Honor, I know you're going to 
prepare another set of amended instructions. You stated 
there were three. I see the one where you said you were 
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going to change hydrocodone and meperidine is prescribed 
and possessed. Are you changing the one that you just 
stated is the other one, just the --
THE COURT: Changing possessed with the last 5 
on it. ( Inaudible) 
MR. BENGE That won't change the order? 
THE COURT: That won't change the order or 
change the section. 
I just made a lot of adaptations MR. BENGE 
on my set. 
THE COURT: Okay. Court will be in recess. 
You can do whatever you want to do. 
(Pause in proceedings). 
THE COURT: Please be seated. Thank you for 
being here today promptly, members of the jury. Counsel 
are here, defendant is here. 
All right. Counsel, here's copies of the 
instructions for you with the changes we agreed to. 
Here's a set for each one of the jurors. 
Members of the jury, I'm going to read these 
to you, and then Mr. Benge will address you, and then 
Mr. Skordas will address you. Because Mr. Benge has the 
burden of proof, he'll get the last word. Each of them 
will have about 30 minutes. I'll let Mr. Benge know 




INSTRUCTION NO, 3 
In order to obtain a conviction, the state must prove eacn 
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Those elements 
are as follows: 
COUNT I: POSSESSION OF PSILOCBIN IN A DRUG FREE ZONE 
1. That on or about April 20, 2002, 
2. Defendant possessed psilocm, 
3. In a drug free zone, and 
4. Knowing what it was and intending to possess it. 
COUNT II: ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF HYDROCODONE IN A DRUG FREE 
ZONE 
1. That on or about April 20, 2002, 
2. Defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed 
hydrocodone, 
3. In a drug free zone, 
4. Without a prescription or otherwise complying with 
the law 
COUNT III: ILLEGAL POSSESSION CF DEMEROL IN A DRUG FREE ZONE 
1. That on or about April 20, 2 0 02, 
2. Defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed 
demerol, 
3. In a drug free zone, 
4. Without a prescription or otherwise complying with 
the law 
If you believe that the state has proved each of these 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant 
guilty. If the state has failed to prove any one of those elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant not guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. IQ 
Physicians licensed to prescribe controlled substances must 
still obtain a prescription for any controlled substances for 
personal use. Physicianrs licensed to dispense or administer 
controlled substances are also permitted to possess reasonable 
quantities of controlled substances for dispensing or 
administering to patients, but they are required to keep a record 
of controlled substances received for that purpose and dispensed 
or administered by them as physicians. A physician who fails to 
comply with this requirement possesses those substances 
illegally. 
Addendum H 
Gregory G. Skordas (#3865) 
SKORDAS & CASTON 
Suite 810 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7444 
Facsimile: (801) 531-8885 
Attorneys for Defendant 
In the Seventh Judicial District Court 
In and For Grand County, State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
NATHANIEL FREDERICK PENN, 
Defendant. 
MOTION IN LIMINE 
Case No. 021700103 
Judge Lyle Anderson 
The Defendant, Nathaniel Frederick Perm, by and through his attorney of record, Gregory 
G. Skordas, hereby moves this court to limit the irrelevant statements made by informant, Lisa 
LaPlante pursuant to Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
On January 18, 2002, LaPlante provided the Moab City Police Department with a 
Statement Form describing her interactions and observations of the Defendant in his medical 
practice. Additional statements were made on January 21, 2002, January 29, 2002 and January 
30, 2002. Many of the statements contained therein are either irrelevant, or if deemed relevant, 
are unduly prejudicial and should be excluded on that basis. 
Rule 402 states that irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Evidence is irrelevant if it has 
no bearing on the defendant's guilt or innocence of the charged offense. See State v. Stephens. 
667 P.2d 586 (Utah 1983). LaPlante's statements are not relevant to the charges of possession of 
controlled substances. Many of the instances described in the January 18, 2002 statement are 
regarding the Defendant's conduct at work. There are allegations of a sexual nature that are 
totally unrelated to the possession charges. Further, LaPlante alleges the Defendant was 
engaging in questionable practices with regard to his prescribing of certain medications, 
something for which the Defendant is not charged in this case. 
Evidence is limited to only those facts bearing on the Defendant's guilt or innocence of 
the charged offenses. Therefore, LaPlante's testimony should be limited to only those facts 
regarding the possession charges for which the Defendant is being tried. 
DATED this Jl day of l'C*A*r , 2002. 
SKORDAS & CASTON 
Skordas 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the i 1 day of Nu.VJ 2002, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing MOTION IN LIMINE was faxed and hand-delivered to the following: 
William Benge 
Grand County Attorney's Office 
125 East Center Street 
Moab, UT 84532 
Fax: (435) 259-3926 
Uc'r . ' .^ iA 
Skordas & Caston 
J 
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